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MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN NEW YORK: TOBACCO
CONTROL AT THE LOCAL LEVEL*
Laura D. Hermert
INTRODUCTION
The Multistate Tobacco Settlement Agreement ("MSA7) of
1998 settled suits brought in 41 states by their respective
attorneys general against certain tobacco manufacturers' to
recoup Medicaid expenditures for treating smoking-related
illnesses.2 The settlement also halted the prospect of similar
*©1999 Laura D. Hermer. All Rights Reserved.
t J.D., Northeastern University, 1998. As a staff attorney at the Tobacco
Control Resource Center in Boston, Massachusetts, Ms. Hermer co-authored the
Massachusetts branch of the American Cancer Society's Blueprint for appropriating
and spending Massachusetts' share of the Multistate Tobacco Settlement funds, co-
authored an analysis of the Multistate Tobacco Settlement for the national office
of the American Cancer Society, and was part of the Massachusetts Department of
Health's Community Action Statewide Team which assisted municipalities in
drafting sound tobacco control ordinances. She currently practices law in Houston,
Texas. This Article is based on work supported by a National Institute of
Health/National Cancer Award, Grant #1 ROl CA67805-01, entitled "Legal
Interventions to Reduce Tobacco Use." Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the prime sponsor. Ms. Hermer would like to thank
Patricia Davidson, staff attorney at the Tobacco Control Resource Center for her
numerous, insightful reviews of this paper and Professor Peter Enrich of
Northeastern University School of Law for his invaluable assistance concerning the
Article's municipal law analysis.
' The original participating manufacturers to the suit are Philip Morris, Inc.,
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Lorillard Tobacco Company, and Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. See Master Settlement Agreement (visited Oct. 22, 1999)
<http.J/www.naag.org/cigmsa.rtf>, § II(hh) [hereinafter MSA]. Since the agreement,
other tobacco manufacturers have subsequently signed onto the deal. See Nat'l
Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Contact List for Subsequent Participating Manufacturers (visit-
ed Apr. 26, 1999) <http/www.naag.org/spmcont.htm> (listing Commonwealth
Brands, Inc., Dhanraj Int'l, Inc., Imperial Tobacco Ltd., Japan Tobacco Internation-
al U.SA, Inc., King Maker Marketing, Lane Ltd., Liggett Group, Inc., Lignum-2,
Inc., LTD Corp., The Medallion Co., Inc., Premier Marketing Inc., P.T. Djarum,
Soci~t6 Nationale d'Exploitation Industrielle des Tabacs et Allumettes, Tobacco
Exporters Int'l, Ltd., and Top Tobacco, L.P.).
2 See Tobacco Products Liability Project, State Suit Summary (visited Apr. 26,
1999) <http://stic.neu.edu>.
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suits by the remaining five states and five territories.3 Its
most salient benefit is undoubtedly the money it will provide to
each of the settling states. In total, the participating manufac-
turers will pay out nearly $206 billion over the next 25 years
to the settling states and territories.4 New York alone will
receive over $25 billion through the MSA.5
The achievement of the settlement marks a milestone in
the long fight to make the tobacco industry-the manufacturer
of the single greatest cause of preventable death in this coun-
try6 -financially accountable for the harm caused by its prod-
ucts.' States, however, appear to be treating the settlement as
a financial windfall, rather than as funding to help ensure an
end to tobacco addiction and the disease it causes. It currently
appears that only a few states-and New York is not among
them-intend to spend at least some of their settlement funds
for tobacco control purposes.8 The remaining states will likely
use their settlement dollars on items such as debt relief-as
certain New York proposals set forth9-sidewalk repair, con-
struction or other such issues.
The MSA does not solely provide a means of transferring
revenue from tobacco manufacturers to states, however. Putt-
ing aside the issue of how the money is spent in each partici-
pating state, a significant question remains: What impact, if
any, will the MSA's substantive provisions have on tobacco
control legislation at the state and local levels?
' See generally Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. website (visited Apr. 26, 1999)
<http://www.naag.org>. Only 46 states are parties to the settlement; the remaining
four-Mississippi, Texas, Florida and Minnesota-had already individually settled
their suits against certain tobacco manufacturers by that date.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Cigarette-Smok-
ing Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost-1990, 42 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 645, 645-49 (19 .. ) (estimating that, in 1990, 419,000
deaths were attributable to cigarette smoking).
For a detailed analysis of the three waves of tobacco litigation from 1954
through 1997, see Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Liti-
gation in the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STANFORD L. &
PoLry REV. 63 (1997).
8 See, e.g., MASSACHUSETrS SENATE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, FISCAL YEAR
2000 BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS 3-195 (1999) (providing for an expansion from
settlement funds of state smoking prevention and cessation programs, totaling $26
million for FY 2000 and potentially expanding up to $33.5 million in FY 2001).
See, e.g., N.Y.S. 1217, 222d Sess. (1999).
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Notwithstanding any protestations by Attorneys General
to the contrary,'0 the MSA will have little impact on the con-
trol of tobacco use." Among its more pertinent provisions, the
agreement contains a number of precatory comments, puts
certain restrictions on advertising, lobbying and youth access
to tobacco products and provides for the creation of a national
foundation to give funding to states for, among other purposes,
illegal drug and tobacco product use prevention.'" Many of
these provisions, however, are hollow; they promise far more
on their face than they will actually deliver." Apart from
some language requiring the much-trumpeted removal of tradi-
tionally-sized and -placed tobacco billboards, the MSA's sub-
stantive provisions will have limited, if any, effect on tobacco
1" See, e.g., Robert E. Pierre & Craig Timberg, Despite Reservations, Maryland,
Virginia Join National Tobacco Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1998, at Al
(quoting Maryland Att'y Gen. J. Joseph Curran, Jr. as saying that "[no one-not
Congress, not the public health community-has delivered more than this particular
settlement"); News Services, 46 States Endorse Tobacco Settlement, THE GAZETTE,
Nov. 21, 1998, at Al (quoting Washington state Att'y Gen. Christine Gregoire as
describing the deal's approval to be "a great day for attorneys general").
" For a detailed partial analysis of the MSA, see TOBACCO CONTROL RESOURCE
CENTER, THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF
STATE AND LOCAL TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TOPICS AND PRO-
VISIONS OF THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 23,
1998 (1999) [hereinafter TOBACCO, CONTROL RESOURCE CENTER], available at (visit-
ed Oct. 22, 1999) <http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/msa/mdex.html>.
2 The MSA expressly sets forth, for example, that both the settling states and
the participating manufacturers are "committed to reducing underage tobacco use
by discouraging such use and by preventing Youth access to Tobacco Products."
MSA, supra note 1, § I. Perhaps most saliently, the MSA provides funding which
the agreement expressly suggests may be used for tobacco control. In the "Recit-
als" section, the MSA provides that settling states
have agreed to settle their respective lawsuits and potential claims pur-
suant to terms which will achieve for the Settling States and their citi-
zens significant funding for the advancement of public health, the imple-
mentation of important tobacco-related public health measures, including
the enforcement of the mandates and restrictions related to such mea-
sures, as well as funding for a national Foundation dedicated to signif-
icantly reducing the use of Tobacco Products by Youth ....
Id. However, apart from potentially providing some leverage for tobacco control
activists who wish to persuade their state legislatures to spend settlement dollars
on tobacco use cessation programs, counteradvertising campaigns such as those in
Massachusetts and Florida, and enforcement of local youth access restrictions or
other measures, such language unfortunately has little practical impact.
13 For examples, see infra Part II.C.; see also TOBACCO CONTROL RESOURCE
CENTER, supra note 11.
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control at the state or local level. It will therefore be
essential for tobacco control efforts not to flag in the face
of the settlement.
Now that the multistate settlement has been reached,
local regulation will likely remain the most effective means of
inhibiting the sale, use and advertising of tobacco products.
The former vice-president and general counsel of Brown &
Williamson, Ernest Pepples, wrote in 1976 with regard to fed-
eral tobacco control legislation:
[t]he tobacco industry, of course, would prefer no regulation at all. If
there must be regulation, the industry is probably better off to have
it at the federal level than be forced to fight off a multitude of non-
uniform regulatory efforts at the state, county and town levels.'
The same may also be said when comparing state to local to-
bacco regulation efforts. The ability of municipalities to regu-
late tobacco products is vital to tobacco control efforts in gener-
al. The tobacco industry has had far more success in diluting,
or even completely preventing, the passage of anti-tobacco
legislation at the state rather than at the local level. For exam-
ple, at the state level, the industry has been relatively success-
ful in blocking or diluting legislation which it finds unconge-
nial to its business efforts. As of September 1998, 31 states
had enacted some form of tobacco control legislation which
preempts action-frequently stricter action-by local govern-
ments. 5 As noted by Walker Merryman, then-Vice President
of the Tobacco Institute, "[albout 90% of legislation at the state
level [adversely] affecting our industry will not be enacted...
[Why?] Because we're good. That may sound arrogant, but I
don't know any other way to put it."6
14 ERNEST PEPPLES, INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO THE CIGARETrEIHEALTH CONTRO-
VERSY (1976), available in Brown & Williamson Collection (visited July 28, 1999)
<http/www.library.ucsf.edutobacco/2200.html> (document 2205.01).
15 Office on Smoking and Health, Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
Preemptive State Tobacco-Control Laws-United States, 1982-1998, 47 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1112-14 (1999); see also Russ Freyman, Butting In, GOV-
ERNING 55 (Nov. 1995); Guide to Preventing Preemption in the 1998 Legislative
Session (visited July 28, 1998) <http://www.no-smoke.org/premstrike.html>; Preemp-
tion: Tobacco Control's Enemy (visited July 28, 1998) <http://www.no-
smoke.org/pospre.html>.
1" Kathleen Sylvester, The Tobacco Industry Will Walk a Mile to Stop an Anti-
Smoking Law, GOVERNING 34, 37 (May 1989).
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Yet at the local level, the situation can be quite different.
Memoranda recently discovered among the thousands of docu-
ments produced in Minnesota v. Philip Morris7 describe the
tobacco industry as "hamstrung" in its efforts to influence anti-
tobacco legislation at the local level. 8 One 1992 Tobacco Insti-
tute memorandum noted that "it had become 'physically
impossible' to attend all the hearings on smoking ordinances,
'let alone mount successful opposition campaigns.'"'9 As stated
by another Tobacco Institute official, "[wihen you have 95,000
local units of government in this country, and you have a finite
amount of resources, then the smart thing to do is to try to
limit the potential for mischief," that is, seek preemption.2"
When faced with a choice between weak, uniform and preemp-
tive state legislation and a patchwork of stricter and irregular
local regulation, the tobacco industry invariably prefers the
state regulation.2' Thus, for those who support stronger tobac-
17 Civ. No. CI-94-8565 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey Cty. filed Aug. 17, 1994).
Myron Levin & Dan Morain, An Inside Look at Battles of Big Tobacco Poli-
tics: Documents Detail the Industry's Decades-Long Efforts to Influence Outcome of
State's 'Smoking Wars,' L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1998, at Al.
1' Id.
20 Jill Lawrence, Tobacco Industry Winning Many Battles Health: Despite Some
Victories by Anti-Smoking Forces, the Powerful Lobby Is Able to Fend Off Most
Opposition Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1990, at D20.
21 See, e.g., Timothy J. DeGeeter, The Politics of Reducing Tobacco Use Among
Children and Adolescents: Why the Food and Drug Administration Cannot Regulate
Tobacco and Proposed Policy for States and Local Communities, 10 J. L. &
HEALTH 367, 394 (1995-1996) ("The tobacco industry's primary legislative goal at
the state level is to preempt local government's discretion to enact tobacco control
ordinances. The legislation is usually promoted as a pro-health initiative that es-
tablishes uniform restrictions, which are usually weak, and local governments are
then prevented from adopting more restrictive initiatives."); Freyman, supra note
15, at 55 (noting in connection with one state bill that it was "just the sort of
legislation the tobacco industry, beleaguered by local governments and anti-smok-
ing activists, has been pushing for in states across the country"); Kelder, supra
note 7, at 69-70 (citing examples of how "t]he industry is also taking an active
part in trying to pass weak, industry-friendly tobacco control legislation at the
state level that would preempt the authority of city, town and county governments
to control the sale and use of tobacco"); see also Peter D. Enrich & Patricia A.
Davidson, Local and State Regulation of Tobacco: The Effects of the Proposed Na-
tional Settlement, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 87, 90 (1998) (noting that "[pireemption
is the industry's primary tool for thwarting ... local action"). Note that docu-
ments unearthed from those collected in Minnesota's case against the tobacco in-
dustry disclose that in 1995 the Tobacco Institute budgeted $279,700 for an item
called the "New York State Pre-emption Plan." Tom Precious, Tobacco Industry
May Have Spent Thousands to Target Local Anti-Smoking Laws, BUFFALO NEWS,
Sept. 12, 1998, at C6. The Tobacco Institute reported spending only a third of that
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co control measures, local action is an important tool.
In the State of New York, a conflict between the state and
its municipalities over the authority to regulate certain aspects
of the sale, use and marketing of tobacco products may be
brewing. A substantial number of tobacco-related bills are
under consideration in the 1999 New York State legislative
session.22 This situation is probably due at least in part to the
multistate settlement; not only has the settlement brought
tobacco issues into an even brighter spotlight, but it has also
necessitated prompt passage of legislation to both appropriate
and protect incoming settlement fundsY
Only one of the proposed tobacco control bills of the 1999
term appears to contain any language expressly providing that
it does not preempt any local ordinances or regulations which
on lobbying that year; however, in 1995 the tobacco industry also managed to get
legislation introduced by New York Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno, R-
Brunswick, "to dramatically weaken local smoking laws by pre-empting them with
less restrictive, industry-backed statewide standards," even though it ultimately did
not pass. Id.
22 The following several bills provide a sample of the numerous pieces of legis-
lation proposed this legislative session. New York Senate bill number 2632 would
prohibit the advertising, marketing or promotion of tobacco products on school
grounds or within 1,000 feet of school real property lines. See N.Y.S. 2632, 222d
Sess. (1999). Senate bill number 4088 would restrict the sale of tobacco products
to premises licensed to sell liquor or those exclusively selling tobacco products. See
N.Y.S. 4088, 222d Sess. (1999). Assembly bill number 4603 would direct the com-
missioner of public health to establish a public education campaign to educate
teens about the dangers of smoking. See N.Y.A_ 4603, 222d Sess. (1999). Assembly
bill number 4466 would amend New York Public Health Law section 1399-n to
more stringently regulate smoking in restaurants and other food service establish-
ments. See N.Y.A. 4466, 222d Sess. (1999). Assembly bill number 3990 would,
among its other provisions, amend New York Public Health Law section 1399-o to
prohibit smoking in private passenger cars, private passenger vans or private
passenger trucks in which one of the occupants is under 16 years of age. See
N.Y.A. 3990, 222d Sess. (1990). Assembly bill number 3574 would criminalize the
possession of tobacco products by individuals under the age of 18. See N.Y.A.
3574, 222d Sess. (1999). Assembly bill number 3292 would amend New York Pub-
lic Health Law section 1399-o to make the provision of nonsmoking areas in food
service establishments optional, at the discretion of the owner, operator or manag-
er. See N.Y.A. 3292, 222d Sess. (1999). Assembly bill number 1612 would increase
penalties for violating regulations concerning the sale of tobacco products. See
N.Y.A. 1612, 222d Sess. (1999).
s For an analysis of the necessity of enacting legislation to require non-par-
ticipating manufacturers to contribute to a special fund, see Richard A. Daynard,
The Non-Participating Manufacturer Adjustment, Qualifying Statutes, and the Mod-
el Statute in Exhibit T of the MSA, in TOBACCO CONTROL RESOURCE CENTER,
supra note 11, at 32.
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at least meet the minimum standards set forth in the bill.'
For New York municipalities interested in passing their own
tobacco-control laws, several questions thus arise. If any of
these bills become enacted, could a local law regulating the
same subject withstand a challenge to its validity in the face of
the state's regulation of the same areas? What effect might the
state legislation have on anti-tobacco laws already enacted or
under consideration by other municipalities? Might regulations
passed by local health boards have a better chance than local
ordinances of surviving challenges based on conflicts with or
preemption by state laws? Local governments need to know
how the existence (or lack) of laws regulating the sale, avail-
ability, use or advertising of tobacco products at the state level
may affect their ability to pass ordinances regulating the same
issues within their own municipal limits.
The ability of local governments to pass regulations affect-
ing various aspects of their own affairs is grounded in the
home rule powers granted by the state to municipalities.25
Both constitutional and legislative provisions govern the exis-
tence and scope of these powers.26 Additionally, county or oth-
er local public health departments may be able to control vari-
ous aspects of tobacco sale and use through regulatory authori-
ty granted to them by the state.2 This paper will examine the
nature and scope of the ability of both municipalities and local
public health departments to govern the local sale, use,
availability and advertising of tobacco products in the con-
text of New York state law and the recent Multistate
Settlement Agreement."
Part I will begin with a description of municipalities in
New York and a summary of the provisions of article 9 of the
New York Constitution and section 10 of the state Municipal
Home Rule Law, which delimit spheres in which municipalities
24 See N.Y.S. 836, N.Y.A. 836-B, 222d Sess. (1999).
25 Unless otherwise specified, in this Article, "local governments," "municipali-
ties" and "localities" refer collectively to counties, cities, towns and villages. See
N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 3(d)(2) (defining "local government" as "[a] county, city, town
or village"); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 2(8) (McKinney 1999) (same).
26 See, e.g., N.Y. CONsT. art. 9, §§ 1-3; N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW §§ 1-59.
" See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 308 (McKinney 1998).
28 This Article will not consider any potential impact which federal law might
have on the scope of municipal home rule in New York State, instead focusing
solely on state law.
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may act without state interference and others in which the
state may act notwithstanding local interests. Part II will
examine these provisions in greater depth. The first section of
Part II will focus on the specific provisions affirmatively grant-
ing municipalities the power to pass or amend laws concerning
certain of their own affairs and the limits of those powers. The
second section will focus on the limits that constitutional and
statutory provisions place on state interference with municipal
home rule powers and the narrow interpretation that the
courts have given these provisions. The third section will ex-
amine the effect of this framework on the ability of New York
municipalities to adopt specific tobacco control measures, in
light of extant tobacco control measures at the state level and
the likely effects of the MSA. Lastly, Part III will evaluate the
statutory powers of local health boards to regulate local health
concerns connected with the use of tobacco products and judi-
cial interpretations of these powers.
I. THE GENERAL HOME RULE FRAMEWORK
In New York, municipal corporations are political as well
as corporate bodies. They possess not merely the traditional
corporate powers,29 but also the right to exercise part of the
political power of the state.3" There are four primary types of
municipal corporations in New York with which this paper will
be concerned: counties, towns, cities and villages.31 State law
defines both counties and towns to be "municipal corporation[s]
comprising the inhabitants within [their] boundaries, and
formed for the purpose of exercising such powers and discharg-
ing such duties of local government and administration of
29 These include "a legal entity and name, a seal by which to act in solemn
form, a capacity to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, a person-
al standi in judicio, to hold and dispose of property, and thereby to acquire rights
and incur liabilities, with power of perpetual succession, inhabitants and territory."
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUN. CORP. § 2.07a (3d ed. rev. 1990).
" See id. § 2.07a; see also N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 1-102 (McKinney 1999) (pro-
viding that: "The citizens of the state of New York, from time to time inhabitants
of the territory comprised within the boundaries of any village heretofore or here-
after incorporated shall continue to be a municipal corporation in perpetuity under
its corporate name and the same shall in that name be a body politic and corpo-
rate in fact and in law, with power of perpetual succession.").
" See supra note 25.
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public affairs as have been, or, may be conferred or imposed
upon [them] by law."32 They are "involuntary subdivisions of
the state created for the most part for convenience and for
more expeditious state administration."3 Cities and villages,
on the other hand, have been judicially characterized as "corpo-
rations organized by the voluntary action of local inhabitants
and limited by statute or charter."34 While there is no statuto-
ry definition of either of the two, state law specifies that in
order for a village to incorporate and thus become a village,35
it must have a population of at least 500 and an area either
limited to five square miles, or coterminous with the entire
boundaries of a school, fire, fire protection, fire alarm,
town special or town improvement district, parts of the bound-
aries of more than one such district, or the entire boundaries of
a town.36
In the furtherance of "effective local government" by such
municipalities, the State of New York amended its constitution
to grant certain home rule-or self-rule-powers to them, first to
cities in 1894 and then later to the other municipal corpora-
tions.3" The constitutional provision created through these
amendments, New York Constitution article 9, affirmatively
grants power to local governments while restricting the power
of the state to intrude on matters of local concern." It also
32 N.Y. TOWN LAW § 2 (McKinney 1999); see also N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 3
(McKinney 1999).
' Curtis v. Eide, 19 A.D.2d 507, 508, 244 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (1st Dep't 1963);
see also Nassau County v. Lincer, 165 Misc. 909, 913, 3 N.Y.S.2d 327, 333
(Nassau County Ct. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 254 App. Div. 746, 4 N.Y.S.2d
77 (2d Dep't 1938).
3' Curtis, 19 A.D.2d at 508, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 330; see also Lincer, 165 Misc. at
913, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 333 (observing that "villages are voluntary corporations orga-
nized by the action of their own inhabitants for their own local benefit and limited
by the statute as to population or as to area and extent").
' Cf. Lincer, 165 Misc. at 914, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 333. The court also defined cities
as corporate entities. See id.; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
36 See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-200(1) (McKinney 1999).
37 N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 1. The 1938 amendments extended the home rule
provisions to counties, villages with a population of over 5,000 enjoyed home rule
powers by 1940, and by 1963, further amendments extended home rule power to
towns and all previously excluded villages, as well. See Richard Briffault, Local
Government and the New York Constitution, 1 HoFsTRA L. & POL'y SYMP. 79, 86-
87 (1996).
" See James Cole, Local Authority to Supersede State Statutes, 63 N.Y. STATE
BAR J. 34, 34 (Oct. 1991).
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provides that these municipal home rule powers must be "lib-
erally construed,"39 thus repudiating Dillon's Rule, the former
rule which provided that state grants of authority to munici-
palities must be interpreted narrowly in order to permit the
state to retain a maximum amount of power.4"
Article 9 grants local governments the power to adopt laws
concerning their own property, affairs or government, as long
as such laws do not conflict with the state constitution or gen-
eral laws.41 In addition to this grant, article 9 also gives local-
ities the power to adopt and amend local laws regarding a
number of other subjects, most notably, for our purposes, those
traditionally falling under the scope of the police power.42 In
N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 3(c).
,' See Briffault, supra note 37, at 86. Under Dillon's Rule, whenever it is un-
certain whether a municipality possesses a given power, the court must conclude
that it lacks that power. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure
of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (Jan. 1990). By reversing this
assumption and instead requiring courts to assume that municipalities possess a
power unless it is retracted or proven otherwise, New York follows the "legislative
home rule" model. Cf. id. at 10.
41 See N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(c)(i). The meaning of the phrase "property, af-
fairs or government" is as ambiguously defined in the caselaw as the phrase is
general, and for the most part has been defined in the negative, rather than in
the positive. See, e.g., Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 491, 362
N.E.2d 581, 582-83, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950 (1977) ("To categorize as a matter of
purely local concern the future of the forests, open spaces, and natural resources
of the vast Adirondack Park region . . . would give a substantially more expansive
meaning to the phrase 'property, affairs or government' of a local government than
has been accorded it in a long line of cases interpreting successive amendments to
the home rule article."); Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 476, 167 N.E. 705, 708
(1929) ("The fact is that the state Legislature, in drafting those provisions which
subsequently . . . became the home rule measure in the Constitution, knew and
realized that the words 'property, affairs or government of cities' did not include
health measures, or those already covered by the Tenement House Law, which of
its nature is a health measure.").
42 N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(c)(ii)(1)-(10). Other subjects specifically delineated in
this section are: (1) the determination of certain terms and conditions of the
locality's public officers and employees; (2) the determination of the membership
and composition of the locality's legislative body if it is a city, town or village; (3)
the transaction of its business; (4) the incurring of its obligations; (5) the presenta-
tion, ascertainment and discharge of claims against the locality; (6) the acquisition,
care, management and use of its roads, byways and property; (7) the acquisition,
ownership and operation of its transit facilities; (8) the levying and collection of
legislatively-authorized local taxes and assessments for local improvements; and (9)
certain terms and conditions of the employment of any employees of a contractor
or subcontractor performing work for the locality. See id. Note that although many
of the home rule powers granted through article 9 relate to the internal political
and administrative organization of localities, a discussion of such powers is beyond
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this context, it provides that localities may adopt and amend
laws regarding "the government, protection, order, conduct,
safety, health and well-being of persons or property [of the
locality]."' Outside of the specified areas above, however, the
state retains all power otherwise delegated to it by law." This
provision means that municipalities possess power only to the
extent that the state has validly delegated it to them through
the constitution or by statute."
Section 2(b)(1) of article 9 also provides that the state
legislature must enact a statute of local government, granting
to municipalities supplementary powers of local legislation and
administration in addition to those already granted to localities
through article 9. New York Municipal Home Rule Law section
10 forms the heart of the statute of local governments enacted
in response to this constitutional directive. It states that in
addition to the home rule powers already granted to municipal-
ities through the constitution, localities may adopt and amend
laws "not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution
or... with any general law relating to its property, affairs or
government."46 It also grants municipalities the power to
adopt and amend laws relating to a number of specific top-
ics." While most of these specific grants are not likely to be
helpful in regulating tobacco products, one of them gives mu-
nicipalities the authority to adopt laws regulating or licensing
occupations or businesses." Finally-and notably-the section
the scope of this paper and will not be included here.
4 N.Y. CONST. art 9, § 2(c)(ii)(10).
44 See id. §3(a). This section also expressly provides that any state law pre-
dating article 9 continues in force until modified or repealed, regardless of any
impact which article 9 would otherwise have upon it. See id.
41 See, e.g., People v. DeJesus, 54 N.Y.2d 465, 468, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1261, 446
N.Y.S. 2d 207, 208 (1981); Ames v. Smoot, 98 A.D.2d 216, 217-18, 471 N.Y.S.2d
128, 130 (2d Dep't 1983).
46 See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (McKinney 1999). Municipalities
have the authority to adopt such laws (or any other law adopted through use of
its home rule powers), however, only to the extent that such laws do not impair
the powers of any other local government. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW
§ 10(5).
41 See generally N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii).
", See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12). Other potentially relevant
grants include the reiteration of the constitutional provision of traditional police
powers to localities, and, most notably, grants that give towns and villages the
right to supersede general state, town and village law unless the state has ex-
pressly prohibited the adoption of such a local law. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE
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provides that the legislative body of a local government has the
power to administer and enforce the laws it validly enacts.49
At the same time that the constitution and home rule law
authorize municipal action in a wide range of fields, they also
set some procedural limits on the ability of the state legisla-
ture to impinge on local authority. One of these limits prevents
the state from interfering with any particular locality's regula-
tion of its own "property, affairs or government" unless it does
so by means of a general law.5" In the context of article 9, a
"general law" is a law "which in terms and in effect applies
alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly in-
cluded within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages," regard-
less of each municipality's population, location, or any other
quality by which it might be classified." Not infrequently,
however, the state legislature wishes to enact "special" laws,
i.e., laws relating to the affairs of one or more, but not all,
local governments." In such a case, the constitution specifies
that if the subject of the law pertains to the property, affairs or
government of the affected localities, then the legislature must
LAW §§ 10(1)(ii)(d)(3), 10(1)(ii)(e)(3).
49 See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(4)(a) (providing that the local govern-
ment has the power to "delegate to any officer or agency of such local government
the power to adopt resolutions or to promulgate rules and regulations for carrying
into effect or fully administering the provisions of any local law . . . ."); see also
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(4)(b) (providing that the local government has
the power to "provide for the enforcement of local laws by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings which are or may be provided or authorized by law, to prescribe that vio-
lations thereof shall constitute misdemeanors, offenses or infractions and to provide
for the punishment of violations thereof by civil penalty, fine, forfeiture or impris-
onment.. . ."). Not surprisingly, the local governments that have adopted tobacco
control laws have almost universally taken advantage of the power given by these
provisions. See infra Part II.A.
10 N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(b)(2). As we shall see below, the courts have given
"property, affairs or government" a narrow and technical, albeit elusive, meaning.
"1 Id. § 3(d)(1); see also James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York:
The Ghost of Home Rule, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713, 716 (1985). Cole notes that
the definition of general laws in the context of municipal home rule is different
than that used in other contexts. When used in other New York legal applications
other than home rule law, "general law" may refer to a law regarding a certain
class of counties, cities, towns or villages, based on population or some other char-
acteristic, rather than to all of them notwithstanding differences among them. See
id. at 723-24. Where laws are not subject to constitutional home rule restrictions
but instead to other restrictions (such as, for instance, those pertaining to the
power to tax), this non-home rule definition of general laws applies. See id. at
723-25.
52 N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 3(d)(4).
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follow particular procedural rules which require either the
legislative receipt of a home rule message from the affected
locality or an emergency message from the governor, concurred
in by two-thirds of the state legislature.53 These procedures
were designed to protect the home rule powers of the localities
which would be affected by the special law. The constitution
also prohibits the state legislature from diminishing or repeal-
ing any general state grant of power to municipalities relating
to their property, affairs or government.54 It also provides
that, in order to diminish or repeal any other general state
grant of power to local governments, the legislature must fol-
low special procedures.55
II. THE HOME RULE FRAMEWORK, APPLIED
The home rule provisions described above have been inter-
preted in ways which do not always follow plainly from the
language of the New York Constitution and statutes. Most
notably, the precedence of municipal over state law, or vice
versa, in certain situations has occasionally received judicial
treatment inconsistent not only among different cases, but also
with the "liberal" construction of home rule powers stipulated
by New York Constitution article 9, section 3(c). Thus, it is
necessary to examine more thoroughly the provisions described
in Part I in order to understand how they affect local tobacco
control legislation.
A. Affirmative Grants of Power to Municipalities
While the framework provided by the municipal home rule
provisions of the New York Constitution and statutes is com-
plex, the state Court of Appeals has made at least one clear
statement concerning the scope of local governments to validly
adopt tobacco control laws. In People v. Cook,5" the court held
that home rule gave the City of New York the power to regu-
' See id §§ 2(b)(2)(a), 2(b)(2)(b); see also infra Part II.B. A home rule request
is a message from the governing body of an affected municipality giving the legis-
lature the municipality's consent to enact the legislation.
54 See N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(b)(1).
" See id. This issue will be discussed further in Part II.B, infra.
56 34 N.Y.2d 100, 312 N.E.2d 452, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1974).
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late retail prices of cigarettes in a way which created a price
difference between brands having a higher tar and nicotine
content and those possessing a lower tar and nicotine con-
tent. 7 The criminal court, City of New York, convicted the
defendant retailer for violating a section of the New York City
Administrative Code which mandated different rates of taxa-
tion (and concordant pricing) of cigarettes based on the
cigarettes' tar and nicotine content. The supreme court, appel-
late term, affirmed the conviction." On appeal, the defendant
argued that the scope of the local police power did not encom-
pass the ability to impose a price differential. 9
In its consideration of the argument, the court, using the
familiar constitutional test, stated that a municipal law must
have an acceptable purpose and bear a reasonable relation
towards effecting that purpose in order to fall within the scope
of police powers delegated by the constitutional and statutory
municipal home rule provisions." Under the first prong of the
test, both parties conceded that the local law in question was
passed for the purpose of promoting public health by reducing
the quantity of high tar and nicotine cigarettes smoked by the
city's inhabitants.61 Such a purpose, the court stated, was ac-
ceptable under state police power." Through New York's
home rule provisions, the state granted police power to munici-
palities similar to that enjoyed by the state itself.63 Because
the state could validly enact a law such as the one in question
under its state police power, and because local police power
derives from that of the state, the purpose of the New York
City law in question was therefore also acceptable under the
city's municipal police power."
17 See id. at 106-07, 312 N.E.2d at 456, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 264-65.
58 See id. at 104, 312 N.E.2d at 454, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
5' See id., 312 N.E.2d at 454, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 262. The issue at hand was a
price, rather than tax, differential. The regulations "require[d] a difference in the
retail price of cigarettes at least equivalent to the amount of tax attributable to
their tar and nicotine content." Id. at 103, 312 N.E.2d at 454, 356 N.Y.S.2d at
262. The defendant did not contest the tax itself, but rather the requirement that
the prices charged reflected the difference in tax.
6" See Cook, 34 N.Y.2d at 105, 312 N.E.2d at 455, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
6 See id. at 106, 312 N.E.2d at 455, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
62 See id., 312 N.E.2d at 456, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
6' See id.
64 See id.
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Under the second prong of the test, the court stated that
requiring consumers to pay a higher price for cigarettes known
to be more harmful than others bore a reasonable relation to
the acceptable purpose of reducing the consumption of such
cigarettes.65 It was reasonable, the court determined, for the
city council to believe that by raising the price of more harmful
cigarettes, it could reduce their purchase and use.66 Because it
found that the purpose was acceptable and that the
means employed bore a reasonable relation to that purpose,
the court concluded that the local law constituted a valid exer-
cise of the city's police powers under the municipal home
rule provisions.67
Thus, following the reasoning of Cook, a municipality may
adopt tobacco control ordinances, as long as the ordinance
meets two tests: first, the purpose for which the ordinance is
adopted must be within the scope of powers granted to munici-
palities and, second, the provisions of the ordinance must bear
a reasonable relation to that purpose. Most localities should
have little trouble devising tobacco control ordinances which
meet the Cook test. Numerous such ordinances have been
adopted for the purpose held valid in Cook: to protect and
promote the public health." Others have also been enacted
for the purpose of reducing youth access to tobacco products
and delinquency caused through the theft of tobacco by minors
or unlawful sale of tobacco products to minors.69 To date, no
ordinance has been stricken either because it was adopted for
a purpose outside the scope of municipal authority based on
"' See Cook, 34 N.Y.2d at 108, 312 N.E.2d at 457, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 265-66. A
state may use a price differential in order to effectuate a purpose under its police
powers. See id. at 104, 312 N.E.2d at 455, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 263 (citing Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-25, 531-32 (1934)).
16 See id. at 108, 312 N.E.2d at 457, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67.
' See id. The defendant made two other arguments relevant to the scope of
municipal home rule powers, involving the doctrines of inconsistency and the "spe-
cial conditions" exception, although the court rejected both. See id. at 109, 312
N.E.2d at 457, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67; see also infra Part II.B.
" See, e.g., Niagara County, N.Y., [1998] Legislature Res. No. HS-037-98 (regu-
lating smoking in public places due to health concerns); Erie County, N.Y., 11996]
N.Y. Local Laws (No. 5) (same).
6 See, e.g., Cortland County, N.Y., [1997] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 6) (prohibiting
self-service sales of tobacco products to minors in part because of their contribu-
tion to shoplifting and unlawful sales); Genesse County, N.Y., [1997] N.Y. Local
Laws (No. 3) (same).
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New York state law or because the means employed by the
ordinance and its purpose were insufficiently related. °
B. State Restriction of Municipal Home Rule Powers
A local government must consider more, however, than
whether it has simply made a valid use of its home rule pow-
ers when drafting a tobacco control ordinance. Notwith-
standing the broad grant of powers to municipalities, the con-
stitution and home rule law leave substantial opportunity for
the state to impose restrictions on local authority." Therefore,
a local government must also determine whether the state has
already regulated the subject in such a way that no further
regulation at the municipal level is permissible. As one leading
commentator has noted, "the constitution places little restric-
tion on the power of the state to act with respect to local mat-
ters or to displace local decisions with respect to such matters,"
despite the protections mentioned earlier."
" While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals did invalidate a portion of a New
York advertising ordinance, in part on the ground that it had an improper basis,
preemptive federal law rather than state law made that ground improper. See The
Greater New York Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, No. 99-7006, 1999 WL
965691 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1999). The court noted that the New York ordinance,
codified as sections 27-508 to 27-508.6 of the New York City Administrative Code,
prohibits most outdoor advertising of tobacco products, other than vehicular adver-
tising, within 1,000 feet of any school building, playground, child day care center,
amusement arcade or youth center. See id. at *1. It also prohibits most indoor
advertising that may be seen from the street, with the sole exception of permitting
a single "tombstone" style sign, consisting of black and white lettering stating
"TOBACCO PRODUCTS SOLD HERE." Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a mere restriction on the location of advertisements did not run afoul of
the "'comprehensive Federal program' to control cigarette advertising information,"
Id. at *4, and was akin to a zoning regulation. See id. at *6. It therefore upheld
that section of the ordinance. See The Greater New York Metro. Food Council, Inc.,
1999 WL 965691, at *6-*7. However, it struck down the "tombstone" advertising
portion of the ordinance on the ground that it was an advertising restriction based
on smoking and health, an area preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act ("FCLAA"). See id. at *6; see also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1340 (West
1998). It was only because of the FCLAA that the purpose was improper; under
New York state law, tobacco control ordinances based on health-related purposes
are, as we saw in Cook, proper.
71 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 37, at 89 (noting that "the constitution places
little restriction on the power of the state to act with respect to local matters or
to displace local decisions with respect to such matters").
2 Briffault, supra note 37, at 89. For a general discussion of the constitutional
and statutory framework restricting state power to interfere with municipal home
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The state may at any time enact a general law regulating
a subject falling under the home rule powers of New York
municipalities and may do so in a way which effectively pre-
vents a locality from regulating the subject any further.73
Moreover, it may unimpededly enact special laws interfering
with any subject of local interest other than one pertaining to
municipal property, affairs or government.74 Even if it wishes
to regulate local property, affairs or government by means of a
special law, the legislature is not wholly prohibited from such
an enactment, despite the protections accorded by the state
constitution against such action.75 According to New York
Constitution article 9, section 2(b)(2), if the state wishes to
enact a special law interfering with the property, affairs or
government of a given locality or localities, it must follow one
of two procedures. Under the first option, the legislature, in
what is commonly termed a "home rule request," can submit
the law to the municipal government for approval either by
two-thirds of the total membership of its legislative body or by
its chief executive officer in concurrence with a majority of
such membership.76 By following this procedure, the state re-
ceives express permission to regulate from the local govern-
ment(s) that would be affected. Alternatively (excepting New
York City), the governor may certify that an emergency re-
quires passage of the law, and if two-thirds of the state legisla-
ture concurs with the governor, then the special law can be
passed without municipal consent.77
Yet, not even these procedures may be required for the
state to validly enact such a special law. Rather, as a result of
a (still) influential judicial decision, the state may enact a
special law pertaining to a matter of "substantial state con-
rule powers, see supra Part I.
73 See N.Y. CONST. art. 9, §§ 2(b)(2), 2(c)(i).
7' See id. § 3(a)(3).; see also Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490,
493-95, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584-85, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 951-53 (1977) (determining that
the special state law in question did not intrude upon the property, affairs or
government of the affected localities, since "preserving the priceless Adirondack
Park through a comprehensive land use and, development plan is most decidedly a
substantial State concern, as it is most decidedly not merely 119 separate local
concerns").
7. See N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 3(a)(3).
71 Id. § 2(b)(2)(a).
77 See id. § 2(b)(2)(b).
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cern," even if it also interferes with the property, affairs or
government of a municipality. v8 The New York legislature is
also not restrained from restricting, diminishing or repealing
any general powers granted to local governments by statute
(rather than those granted through the state constitution).79 If
it wishes, the legislature may do so by means of a statute
which has been enacted in two separate, consecutive legislative
sessions and signed into law each time by the governor."
Thus, while localities have broad power to regulate their
own affairs, that power remains broad only as long as the state
refrains from enacting preemptive legislation on the subject.
Under many circumstances, state and local legislation regulat-
ing the same matter can co-exist.8 ' Questions arise, however,
when the state may have acted preemptively. Although rarely
a subject of litigation, express preemption occurs where the
state directly states a preemptive intent within a statute re-
garding a particular subject.8 State law also preempts local
7.8 See infra Part II.B.1. (discussing Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E.
705 (1929)).
79 See N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 2(b)(1).
8 See id. The primary detrimental effect which this provision could potentially
have on the ability of municipalities to adopt tobacco control laws would be
through a removal of towns' and villages' ability to supersede inconsistent New
York Town and Village Law, as provided in sections 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) and
10(1)(ii)(e)(3) of the New York Municipal Home Rule Law. See N.Y. MUN. HOME
RULE LAW §§ 10(1)(ii)(d)(3), 10(1)(ii)(e)(3) (McKinney 1999). However, as New York
Town and Village law regulates essentially no issue relevant to tobacco control,
the provision is not particularly troubling in the context of tobacco control. There
also exists a possibility that the provision might adversely affect the ability of
localities to adopt and enforce licensing requirements on retailers of tobacco prod-
ucts, as given through section 10(1)(ii)(a)(12) of the New York Municipal Home
Rule Law. This power, however, is probably amply protected by the general grant
of municipal police power given through article 9, section 2(c)(ii)(10) of the New
York State Constitution.
" See, e.g., People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 109, 312 N.E.2d 452, 457-58, 356
N.Y.S.2d 259, 267 (1974) (where New York City adopted a municipal tax on ciga-
rettes and stipulated that the difference in tax between high and low tar ciga-
rettes must be reflected in the price retailers charge for each, "[t]he fact that the
State also taxes cigarettes has no significant relation to the price-differential as-
pect of the city's enactment, and therefore cannot be said to create an inconsisten-
cf).
82 For an example of a statute employing express preemption, see N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 1399-bb (McKinney 1998) (providing that the section, prohibiting
distribution of tobacco products without charge under almost all circumstances,
"shall govern and take precedence over the provisions of any local law, ordinance,
rule, regulation, resolution, charter or administrative code hereafter enacted by any
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law regulating the same subject when a court finds that the
scope of the statute is so broad and regulated in such detail
that the legislature implied a preemptive intent"3 or that the
state statute directly conflicts with local law.'
These principles have not been rigorously developed in the
field of tobacco legislation in New York state, since very few
local tobacco control ordinances have been challenged as violat-
ing existing state law.85 However, for any municipality consid-
ering enacting or amending tobacco control legislation, it is
useful to consider the types of state interference arguments
which might be made against such measures, as illustrated
through cases involving other, non-tobacco related areas of
regulation. They fall into two primary categories: (1) claims
that state law displaces conflicting local law because the sub-
ject being regulated is one which is in a substantial degree a
matter of state concern, even though local matters may also be
involved,86 and (2) claims that state law preempts local law
political subdivision of the state"). Where the legislature has expressly preempted
a subject of regulation, it has removed any question of its intent with regard to
permitting concurrent local regulation. Thus, in such cases there is no room for a
locality to act independently on the subject.
, See, e.g., Robin v. Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 285 N.E.2d 285, 334
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1972) (holding that because of the scope and detail of state medical
and hospital regulation, state law preempted local law regulating where abortions
may be performed); Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372,
379, 546 N.E.2d 920, 923, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 630 (1989) (same, with regard to
field of regulation of taxation for roadway construction); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Town of Red Hook, 60 N.Y.2d 99, 105, 456 N.E.2d 487, 490, 468 N.Y.S.2d 596,
599 (1983) (same, with regard to field of regulation of power plant siting); People
v. DeJesus, 54 N.Y.2d 465, 470, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1263, 446 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210
(1981) (same, with regard to field of regulation of alcoholic beverage sales).
' See, e.g., Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 17 A.D.2d
327, 330, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1st Dep't 1962) (holding local law invalid where
it prohibited that which was expressly permitted under state law).
, See, e.g., People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 312 N.E.2d 452, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259
(1974); see also Vatore v. Comm'r of Consumer Affairs, 83 N.Y.2d 645, 634 N.E.2d
958, 612 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1994).
,' See infra Part II.B.1. Only if the court also finds that the state has implicit-
ly preempted the field or that there is a direct conflict between state and local
regulations will the state statute then preempt the local ordinance. However, once
a court has found an issue to be a matter of substantial state concern, it is al-
most certain that the court will then find either implied field preemption or im-
permissible conflict. See, e.g., People v. DeJesus, 54 N.Y.2d 465, 430 N.E.2d at
1260, 446 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1981) (once it found sale of alcoholic beverages to be a
matter of substantial state concern, the court of appeals also found the state to
have implicitly preempted the field and therefore that local law regulating same
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either because (a) the state so thoroughly regulates the subject
in question that it implicitly preempts the field" or (b) the
local law permits what state law forbids or forbids what state
law expressly permits." These methods of invalidating local
regulation are discussed below.
1. Matters of Substantial State Concern
The seminal judicial interpretation of the limits on home
rule powers provided by article 9 is found in Adler v.
Deegan.89 Adler is cited primarily for its demarcation of the
different spheres in which New York and its municipalities
may each unimpededly regulate and in which spheres both
may regulate. In the event that a conflict arises between a
state and local law regulating the same subject, a court will
often inquire first into the authority that each governmental
body possesses to regulate the subject. Often, a court may
dispense with the conflict by finding the subject to be one of
subject was invalid); Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d
581, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977) (where court of appeals found the subject of regula-
tion to be a matter of substantial state concern, the court also found local law to
conflict impermissibly with the state statute, thus invalidating local law); Robin v.
Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 285 N.E.2d 285, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1972)
(once it found regulation of medicine and hospital function to be matters of sub-
stantial state concern, the court of appeals also found the state to have implicitly
preempted the field and therefore that local law regulating one aspect of the same
subject was invalid); see also, e.g., Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New
York, 50 N.Y.2d 85, 90, 405 N.E.2d 679, 680, 428 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198-99 (1980)
(determining that residency requirements for members of certain police, fire, cor-
rection and sanitation departments are a matter of state rather than local concern,
and therefore that municipal law regulating the same was void, even though court
refrained from expressly finding the degree of state concern involved). Research for
this Article uncovered no New York case in which the court found the subject of
legislation to be one of substantial state concern, yet did not find that state law
preempted local law in that instance.
7 See infra Part II.B.2.a.
s See infra Part II.B.2.b.
89 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929).
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state concern, thereby frequently negating any need to consider
local interests which may be involved.' Thus, it is necessary
to examine Adler in some detail.
In Adler, the New York Court of Appeals held that a spe-
cial law arguably regulating the property or affairs of New
York City and enacted by the state under its police powers was
valid and did not violate the provisions protecting the city's
home rule powers." It reached this result notwithstanding
the fact that the state legislature did not abide by the proce-
dures then required in order to validly enact such a special
law. While the case itself provides little discussion of the
facts, the following can be gleaned from it. The plaintiff argued
that the state Multiple Dwelling Law was unconstitutional,
violating New York Constitution article 12, section 2 (1929)."
The law regulated a matter falling under the city's home rule
powers, namely, standards for multiple dwellings meant to
promote "sufficient light, air, sanitation, and protection from
fire hazards ... ."" Such a law, it was argued, must be
deemed to pertain to the property and affairs of the city. 5 It
should, therefore, only have been enacted using the procedure
' For perhaps the most extreme example of such an analysis, see Uniformed
Firefighters Ass'n, 50 N.Y.2d at 90, 405 N.E.2d at 680, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 199, in
which the court, virtually without argumentation, determined that "the residence
of [municipal officers and employees], unrelated to job performance or departmen-
tal organization, is a matter of State-wide concern not subject to municipal home
rule." Using this rationale, it dispensed with not only municipal ability to regulate
the subject but also any restrictions on state ability to enact a law concerning the
subject in question by means of special, rather than general, law.
91 See Adler, 251 N.Y. at 477-78, 167 N.E. at 708-09.
See id. at 471, 167 N.E. at 706.
See id. Article 12, section 2 formed the basis for present article 9, section 2.
9' Id. at 492, 167 N.E. at 714 (Lehman, J., dissenting) (citing a legislative
finding of the Multiple Dwelling Act (Laws of 1929, ch. 713)).
" See, e.g., id. at 499, 167 N.E. at 717.
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for passing a special law under what was then New York Con-
stitution article XII, section 2 (now article 9, section 2). 6
The state legislature, however, enacted the law by simple
majority vote.97
The trial court found the plaintiff's case persuasive and
enjoined the defendant from enforcing the law. 8 The court of
appeals, however, disagreed with the lower court's interpreta-
tion of the scope of the phrase "property, affairs or govern-
ment." It found instead that the state as a whole is interested
in the health of the inhabitants of its largest cities. It held that
the state legislature, therefore, ought to be able to govern such
matters as being rightfully under its own purview rather than
having to go through home rule procedures.99 This holding
freed the New York legislature to pass laws applicable to only
one or some municipalities in the state, as long as the mat-
ter being regulated is one of general and substantial
state concern.'
The case, however, is cited not so much for the majority
opinion as for Chief Justice Cardozo's concurring statement
delineating the spheres of state versus local concern and artic-
ulating the appropriate hierarchy of power when those two
concerns are mixed. According to Cardozo's interpretation,
there are certain matters which are "intimately connected with
the exercise by the city of its corporate functions, [and] which
are city affairs only."'0 ' His now-familiar list includes "the
laying out of parks, the building of recreation piers [and] the
institution of public concerts," as well as, "most important of
all,.., the control of the locality over payments from the local
purse."0 2 The Chief Justice noted that this list was not ex-
haustive.0 3 Affairs exclusively of the state, on the other
96 Cf. Adler, 251 N.Y. at 501, 167 N.E. at 717 (O'Brien, J., dissenting) (noting
that "[iif this statute relates to the 'property, affairs or government' of a city, and
is special and local in its effect, it could have been validly enacted only on an
emergency message from the Governor and by a two-thirds vote of each house").
For a discussion of this procedure (this portion of which no longer applies to New
York City), see supra Part I.
See Adler, 251 N.Y. at 471, 167 N.E. at 706.
98 See id.
See id. at 476, 167 N.E. at 708.
100 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 51, at 716-17.
... Adler, 251 N.Y. at 489, 167 N.E. at 712 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
2 Id., 167 N.E. at 713.
1" See id, (noting that "many more [such matters] could be enumerated"). Cer-
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hand, are those which affect the welfare of the public not as in-
habitants of a particular city but as inhabitants of the state in
general.104 Such affairs include the law of domestic relations,
wills, inheritance, contracts, crimes "not essentially local"
(such as larceny or forgery), and the organization and proce-
dure of courts. °5
Cardozo observed that the enumerated items will not al-
ways fall exclusively into either a purely local or a purely state
zone of power.'08 Rather, in some cases, state concerns may
be mixed with local concerns.' O7 In such circumstances, the
pertinent question is whether the state must surrender the
power to enact special laws through normal legislative means
and instead enact the law by means of the procedure given in
New York Constitution article 9, section 2(a)(1).'
In this context, Cardozo noted that a section of article 9,
as then in force, provided that the power of the legislature to
enact laws remained unrestricted with regard to "matters
other than the property, affairs or government" of a locali-
ty. '9 He interpreted this as a statement of state primacy."0
Wishing to provide an objective rather than vague or uncertain
tain later courts have (infrequently) seized on that phrase in protecting home rule
powers of localities. See, e.g., City of New York v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of
New York, Inc., 169 Misc. 2d 566, 642 N.Y.S. 2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1996).
104 See Adler, 251 N.Y. at 489, 167 N.E. at 713 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
105 Id.
106 See id.
10 See id.
106 See id. at 489-90, 167 N.E. at 713.
10 Adler, 251 N.Y. at 490, 167 N.E. at 713. The provision which Cardozo cited
was former article 12, section 4 of the New York State Constitution. The current
corresponding section of the New York State Constitution is article 9, section
3(a)(3), first enacted in 1963, which provides that "Except as expressly provided,
nothing in this article shall restrict or impair any power of the legislature in
relation to ... [m]atters other than the property, affairs or government of a local
government." N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 3(a)(3) (emphasis added). The italicized portion
arguably makes the provision more restrictive than former article 12, section 4 in
that it arguably preserves, for example, the protections to other local powers enu-
merated in article 9, sections 2(c)(ii)(1) through (10). However, this expansion is
insubstantial, in that article 9, sections 2(b)(3) and (c)(ii) expressly reserve to the
state legislature the right to restrict the municipal adoption of laws relating to
article 9 or legislative grants of home rule powers, other than those relating to
municipal property, affairs or government, as it pleases. See N.Y. CONST. art. 9,
§§ 2(b)(3), 2(c)(ii).
11 See Adler, 251 N.Y. at 490, 167 N.E. at 713.
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test, Cardozo therefore determined that the state may, without
restriction, pass laws regarding subjects which are "in a sub-
stantial degree a matter of state concern," even though local
affairs may also be involved."' Thus, in cases in which both
the state and a locality enact laws regarding the same issue
involving the property, affairs or government of the locality, if
the state interest in the issue is "substantial," the state law
will preempt the local one and render the local law (and any
other local law governing the same subject) invalid to the ex-
tent that the two conflict."2
Cardozo noted that this rule by no means wholly negates
local action on a subject of mixed state and municipal con-
cern.' In the absence of state legislation, for example, the
municipality may pass its own laws on a subject of both state
and local interest." Such local laws remain in force at least
until the state validly enacts a law (whether general or specif-
... See id. at 491, 167 N.E. at 714. This formula has been cited by a number of
New York courts since that time in finding that municipal authority must bow
before that of the state. See, e.g., Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New
York, 50 N.Y.2d 85, 90, 405 N.E.2d 679, 680, 428 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198-99 (1980)
(finding that the matter of residency requirements for firefighters, police officers
and certain other municipal employees was a matter of substantial state concern,
and therefore did not impinge upon the municipal home rule powers of a locality
which had adopted a law inconsistent with that enacted at the state level);
Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 498, 362 N.E.2d 581, 586-87, 393
N.Y.S. 2d 949, 954-55 (1977) (where comprehensive state planning and zoning
regulations meant to preserve a state park interfered with the home rule powers
of certain municipalities, yet where preservation of the park was a matter of "sub-
stantial state concern," the state could freely legislate concerning the matter). But
see City of New York v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of New York, Inc., 169
Misc. 2d 566, 579, 642 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1011-12 (1996) (where application of the
state law enabling a state board to invoke its jurisdiction by declaring and manag-
ing an impasse in collective bargaining negotiations between New York City and
its police officers concerned neither "peaceful labor negotiations" nor statewide
uniformity, the court found no substantial state interest at stake which would
justify disregard of the city's home rule interests).
112 See Adler, 251 N.Y. at 491, 167 N.E. at 714. Of course, where, under such
circumstances, state and local law do not impermissibly conflict, see infra Part
II.B.2.b., or where the state has not implicitly preempted the field, see infra Part
II.B.2.a., then the two may coexist.
113 See Adler, 251 N.Y. at 491, 167 N.E. at 714. ("I do not say that an affair
must be one of city concern exclusively to bring it within the scope of the powers
conferred upon the municipality by [the municipal home rule law] in cases where
the state has not undertaken to occupy the field.").
14 See id.
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ic) governing the same subject." 5 But even if the state acts,
the local law may still survive intact if the state law does not
expressly or implicitly preempt any local laws governing the is-
sue.116  In the absence of express or implied preemption,"
7
the local law may continue in force unless it either fails to
meet the minimum standards set by the state law or sets
standards which otherwise act to thwart the purpose of the
state law."'
While as yet there has been no sign of difficulty for local
legislation on the subject of tobacco control in light of an Adle-
rian "substantial state concern" issue, the potential for such a
difficulty ought not be disregarded. Currently, there exists only
one state tobacco control statute with recognized preemptive
effect." 9 At least one New York Court of Appeals decision has
used the fact that only one statute contains preemptive lan-
guage as support for the proposition that the legislature did
not intend the other state tobacco control laws to have any pre-
emptive effect." However, as tobacco control efforts increase,
and as pressure on state legislatures to enact preemptive to-
bacco control legislation rises, there is a danger that state
11 See id.
116 See, e.g., id. (noting that even where the state validly passes a law regard-
ing an issue which is also, in part, a matter of local concern, "there is . . . con-
current jurisdiction for each in default of action by the other"). The municipality,
however, must yield to the state in the event of a conflict. See id.; see also infra
Part H.B.2.
17 See infra Part II.B.2.a.
.. See Adler, 251 N.Y. at 485-86, 167 N.E. at 711-12. As an example, Cardozo
cites a provision of the Multiple Dwelling Law limiting a city's ability to exceed
certain population densities when setting its zoning laws. Id. If a local law govern-
ing the same subject did not meet the minimum standard set by the state law,
then it would have to yield to the state provisions. See id. However, if it provided
for stricter standards in a way which harmonized with the purposes of the state
law, then the local law would likely be able to continue in force. See id. at 486,
167 N.E. at 712. For a more detailed discussion of conflict preemption as it ap-
plies in issues involving municipal home rule, see infra Part II.B.2.b.
11 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-bb (McKinney 1998) (prohibiting, with
few exceptions, the free distribution of any tobacco products or coupons redeemable
for tobacco products and noting that "[t]he provisions of sections § 1399-bb . . . of
article 13-F of the public health law as added by section three of this act . ..
shall govern and take precedence over the provisions of any local law, ordinance,
rule, regulation, resolution, charter or administrative code hereafter enacted by any
political subdivision of the state").
120 See Vatore v. Comm'r of Consumer Affairs, 83 N.Y.2d 645, 651, 634 N.E.2d
958, 961, 612 N.Y.S.2d 357, 359-60 (1994).
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statutes permitting local anti-tobacco efforts will become the
exception, rather than the rule.21 Such a result may be trig-
gered through a judicial interpretation that tobacco control is a
matter of substantial state concern and, therefore, that state
regulatory efforts override those on the local level. 122 If such
a judicial interpretation occurred, it would likely be in conjunc-
tion with a determination that the state has evidenced an
intent to preempt the field of regulation, whether expressly or
implicitly, or, even more likely, that state and local law
impermissibly conflict.' If such a conjunction did occur, in-
consistent or otherwise preempted local tobacco control legisla-
tion would be invalidated.'2
121 See supra Introduction.
' This is particularly significant in that, in neither of the two New York cases
concerning local regulation of tobacco products in the context of home rule has the
court made any finding that regulation of tobacco products is a matter of local
concern. See Vatore, 83 N.Y.2d at 651, 634 N.E.2d at 961, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60;
People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 312 N.E.2d 452, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1974). In the
absence of such a finding, there is always a danger that a New York court will
"usen the State concern doctrine as a rubric for invalidating local [tobacco control]
laws inconsistent with State laws." Cole, supra note 38, at 37.
12 See supra note 86; infra Parts II.B.2.a. & II.B.2.b. This would be the most
likely finding since, if there had been no conflict between the state and local law
to begin with, then the issue would probably not be before the court.
124 Given the likelihood that preemptive tobacco control legislation at the state
level will be proposed at some point in the future, interested municipalities and
tobacco control activists may do well to pay attention to such new measures and
be prepared to act with regard to them. Raymond Porfiri, Esq., formerly of the
Tobacco Products Liability Project in Boston, MA, developed the following checklist
for those supporting a particular tobacco control measure, particularly at the state
level. One ought to be able to answer each of the following questions affirmatively:
(1) "Does the law advance an important tobacco control objective without destroy-
ing some other important tobacco control objective? . . . Is the law likely to de-
crease consumption of cigarettes by adults or minors? If so, how? . . . Is the law
likely to reduce the exposure of nonsmokers to environmental tobacco smoke? If
so, how?", (2) "Does the law appear to be immune to legal challenge?", (3) "Does
the federal or state law contain anti-preemption language so that it does not pre-
empt state or local laws?", and 4) "Is the law as easy to enforce as a parking
violation?" RAYMOND C. PORFIRI, BASIC FOUR-PART TEST FOR TOBACCO CONTROL
LEGISLATION (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Porfiri notes
that if one can answer all four questions affirmatively, and if the tobacco industry
does not oppose the measure or is in favor of it, one should recheck one's analysis.
See id.
[Vol. 65: 2
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE AND TOBACCO CONTROL
2. State Preemption
New York state law has supremacy over any municipal
law, unless otherwise provided in the state constitution or by
statute." Hence, state enactments may, if the legislature so
provides or the court so finds, override and invalidate any
municipal laws governing the same subject. Very generally, in
most jurisdictions-including New York-preemption may occur
under two types of circumstances. First, if the legislature in-
tended, either expressly or by implication, to regulate the sub-
ject so thoroughly as to leave no space for any other regulation
by any other legislative body unless so expressly provided,
then the state is said to "preempt the field."1 26 Although this
term is occasionally found in New' York state law,12 more of-
ten the courts refer to field preemption simply as "preemp-
tion." 1 28 Second, if a local law is in "actual conflict" with a
state law, then the state law preempts the municipal one.
2 9
Such "conflict preemption" is frequently termed "inconsistency"
under New York law.3 0
125 See N.Y. CONST. art 9, § 3(c) (providing that "Except as expressly provided,
nothing in [the constitutional municipal home rule provisions] shall restrict or
impair any power of the legislature in relation to ... [m]atters other than the
property, affairs or government of a local government."); cf. People v. DeJesus, 54
N.Y.2d 465, 468, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1261, 446 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (1981) (noting that
"the fount of the police power is the sovereign State").
126 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §6-27, at
497 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing field preemption in the context of federal law). Note
that most New York courts refer to field preemption simply as preemption. See,
e.g., Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546
N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 219, 505 N.E.2d 915, 918, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 352-53 (1987);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Town of Red Hook, 60 N.Y.2d 99, 456 N.E.2d 487, 468
N.Y.S.2d 596 (1983). Unless otherwise expressly noted, such convention will be
followed in this Article.
12 See, e.g., Vatore v. Comm'r of Consumer Affairs, 83 N.Y.2d 645, 649, 634
N.E.2d 958, 959, 612 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358-59 (1994).
12, See, e.g., Albany Area Builders Ass'n, 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922,
547 N.Y.S.2d at 629; Consolidated Edison Co., 60 N.Y.2d at 105, 456 N.E.2d at
490, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 599.
'"' See TRIBE, supra note 126, §6-26, at 481. For discussion of conflict preemp-
tion, see infra Part II.B.2.b.
1" See, e.g., Vatore, 83 N.Y.2d at 649, 634 N.E.2d at 959, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 358-
59; Consolidated Edison Co., 60 N.Y.2d at 107, 456 N.E.2d at 491, 468 N.Y.S.2d
at 599; People v. DeJesus, 54 N.Y.2d 465, 468, 430 N.E.2d 1260, 1261, 446
N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (1981).
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a. Field Preemption
Field preemption may be either express or implied. When
legislation expressly preempts a field of regulation, it states as
one of its provisions that the statute or section has precedence
over any local legislation on the subject. 3' For example, an
amendment to New York Public Law section 1399-bb, prohibit-
ing tobacco products merchants from distributing tobacco prod-
ucts without charge, expressly provides that
[t]he provisions of sections 1399-bb of article 13-F of the public
health law ... shall govern and take precedence over the provisions
of any local law, ordinance, rule, regulation, resolution, charter or
administrative code hereafter enacted by any political subdivision of
the state. 32
Here, the New York legislature has clearly stated that, if a
municipality adopts any provision-whether stronger, weaker,
or identical to state law-regulating the distribution of free
samples of tobacco products, then state law will preempt it.
On the other hand, when legislation implicitly preempts a
field of regulation, either the purpose and scope of the regula-
tory scheme will be so detailed or the nature of the subject of
regulation will be such that the court may infer a legislative
intent to preempt, even in the absence of an express statement
of preemption.'33 The cases applying an implied preemption
analysis illustrate with relative clarity the factors used to
determine which laws will qualify as preemptive based on
"purpose and scope." The courts tend to consider the following
questions: (1) Did the legislature evidence a desire for state-
wide uniformity of regulation within the legislation itself or its
history?;3 (2) Did the legislature evidence an intention with-
131 See, e.g., Albany Area Builders Ass'n, 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922,
547 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
'11 Ch. 799, § 6, [19921 N.Y. Laws 2228 (McKinney). This is currently the only
New York State tobacco control provision which expressly preempts local law.
" See, e.g., Albany Area Builders Ass'n, 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922,547 N.Y.S.2d at 629; Consolidated Edison Co., 60 N.Y.2d at 105, 456 N.E.2d at
490, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 599; Robin v. Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 350, 285
N.E.2d 285, 286-87, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1972).
13 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co., 60 N.Y.2d at 105-06, 456 N.E.2d at 490,
468 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (where the stated purpose of the legislation was "'to provide
for the expeditious resolution of all matters concerning the location of major steam
electric generating facilities presently under the jurisdiction of multiple state and
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in the legislation itself or its history that a state agency or
other administrative body would have complete or ultimate
responsibility for developing and administering state policy
with regard to the subject of regulation?;35 and (3) Is the leg-
islative scheme detailed, i.e., are all key terms defined 18 and
most matters pertaining to the subject of the law explicitly
regulated in some fashion?37 If a court finds that one or
more of these factors apply, then, in the absence of mitigating
factors, it will usually find the state legislature to have implied
preemptive intent.
138
Factors weighing against preemptive intent include the
following: (1) Is there evidence in the legislative history that
the legislature considered expressly preempting the subject in
question, yet refrained from doing so in the final version?,' 3
local agencies, including all matters of state and local law, in a single proceeding,'"
and where, in approving the measure, the governor "stressed the importance of a
'one-step certification' procedure," the court found that the state's desire for unified
regulation evidenced an intent to preempt the field.)
" See, e.g., Robin, 30 N.Y.2d at 350, 285 N.E.2d at 286-87, 334 N.Y.S.2d at
131 (citing the state law's provision that "in order to provide for the protection
and promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the state . . . the department of
health shall have the central, comprehensive responsibility for the development
and administration of the state's policy with respect to hospital and related servic-
es" as evidence that the state intended to preempt the field).
1 See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211,
219, 505 N.E.2d 915, 918, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 352-53 (1987) (stating in dicta that
the state legislature's failure to define the term "distinctly private" "suggests a
legislative intent to allow local governments to enact pursuant to the municipal
home rule power definitions that are not inconsistent with the meaning of this
broad term").
1 See, e.g., Albany Area Builders Ass'n, 74 N.Y.2d at 377-78, 546 N.E.2d at
922, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 629 (where the state enacted an "elaborate budget system,"
delineating how towns are to budget for roadway improvements and repairs, and
where the state also explicitly regulated at the town level the amount of taxes
collectible for roadway improvements and the expenditure of these funds, the state
evidenced an intent to preempt the field, invalidating a local law regulating the
same subject). But see Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 71 N.Y.2d 91, 99,
518 N.E.2d 903, 907, 524 N.Y.S.2d 8, 12 (1987) (noting that merely because both
the state and a municipality have adopted laws which each "touch upon" the same
subject does not in itself support a determination that the state has preempted
the field).
" See generally Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d
372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989); New York State Club Ass'n v. City
of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 219, 505 N.E.2d 915, 918, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 352-53
(1987); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Town of Red Hook, 60 N.Y.2d 99, 456 N.E.2d
487, 468 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1983).
139 See, e.g., Vatore v. Comm'r of Consumer Affairs, 83 N.Y.2d 645, 651, 634
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and (2) Did the state legislature fail to expressly state its in-
tent to preempt the field, notwithstanding the prior existence
of local law regulating the same subject?"' Although not in
themselves dispositive, the court is more likely to find
against implied preemptive intent where one or both of these
factors exist.'
Generally, when a state law is found to be preemptive, it
displaces all conflicting municipal law on the subject. 42
"Such local laws, 'were they permitted to operate in a field
preempted by State law, would tend to inhibit the operation of
the State's general law and thereby thwart the operation of the
State's overriding policy concerns."4 Where state law pre-
N.E.2d 958, 960-61, 612 N.Y.S.2d 357, 359-60 (1994) (finding that the legislative
history supported the conclusion that the state legislature did not intend to pre-
empt the field, where: (1) the legislature considered a number of preemptive
schemes with regard to the Act in question yet in none of them considered mak-
ing preemptive the provision regulating the siting of tobacco products vending ma-
chines; (2) the Joint Sponsor's Memorandum in support of the final version of the
bill expressly stated that the vending machine provision would permit localities to
adopt additional provisions which at least meet the minimum requirements of the
state law; and (3) a letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Health
to the Governor's Counsel similarly interpreted the provision).
140 See id. (noting that it is "particularly significant" that the legislature failed
to expressly preempt the field of tobacco vending machine siting when enacting
section 1399-dd of the New York Public Health Law, article 13-F, since a munici-
pal law regulating the same subject had already been enacted); see also Jancyn,
71 N.Y.2d at 99, 518 N.E.2d at 907, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 12 (stating that it is "signifi-
cant" that the state statute contains no expression of preemption, despite the fact
that it was enacted shortly after the adoption of a local law regulating the same
subject).
141 See, e.g., Vatore v. Comm'r of Consumer Affairs, 83 N.Y.2d 645, 634 N.E.2d
958, 612 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1994); Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 71 N.Y.2d
91, 518 N.E.2d 903, 524 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1987).
141 See, e.g., Albany Area Builders Ass'n, 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546 N.E.2d at 922,
547 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
4 Id. (quoting Jancyn, 71 N.Y.2d at 97, 518 N.E.2d at 905-06, 524 N.Y.S.2d at
11). "Where the State has preempted the field, a local law regulating the same
subject matter is deemed inconsistent with the State's transcendent interest,
whether or not the terms of the local law actually conflict with a State-wide stat-
ute." Id. At least one recent decision, however, suggests that, at least in certain
cases, state law preempts only local ordinances which vary from the state direc-
tives. In Vatore, the court stated that
[wlhere the State has preempted an entire field, a local law regulating
the same subject matter is inconsistent with the State's interests if it
either (1) prohibits conduct which the State law accepts or at least does
not specifically proscribe, or (2) imposes restrictions beyond those imposed
by the State law.
Vatore, 83 N.Y.2d at 649, 634 N.E.2d at 959, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 358 (citations omit-
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empts a subject of regulation, then a municipality may adopt
regulations dealing with an affected topic only if the state
legislature expressly authorizes local action.'"
b. Inconsistency
Even where state legislation is not found to preempt the
applicable field, it still may limit the scope of permissible regu-
lation. Inconsistency may be found regardless of the preemp-
tive effect of the state law. Inconsistency operates in the same
way as traditional conflict preemption: where a local law either
permits that which state law prohibits, or prohibits that which
state law expressly permits, then the local law may be invali-
dated on the ground of inconsistency.45 For example, New
York law expressly prohibits smoking in auditoriums. "' How-
ever, assume that the town of Newark Valley decided to adopt
an ordinance permitting smoking during drama performances
in the high school auditorium. Such an ordinance, if it existed,
would impermissibly conflict with state law, since it would per-
ted). This formulation has also been used in other cases. See, e.g., New York State
Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 221, 505 N.E.2d 915, 920, 513
N.Y.S.2d 349, 354 (1987); People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 109, 312 N.E.2d 452,
457-58, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259, 266-67 (1974). In the two latter cases, however, the
Court was careful to note that the preemption in question was not general, as the
court in Vatore implies, but only pertained to varying local regulation. Further-
more, neither case cites any example of a state law which preempts only varying
local law.
The formulation given in Vatore permits localities to adopt laws concerning
subjects of preemptive state legislation, as long as any provisions addressing the
preempted subjects are not in tension with the state standards. However, in prac-
tice, it is unlikely to be helpful except in the improbable event in which a locality
wishes to adopt, at the municipal level, provisions already given in state law, and
where the state law expressly states that its provisions preempt only inconsistent
local law.
'" See Robin v. Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347, 350-51, 285 N.E.2d 285,
287, 334 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1972) (citing Kress & Co. v. Department of Health,
283 N.Y. 55, 60, 27 N.E.2d 431, 432 (1940)).
145 See, e.g., Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade v. New York State Restaurant
Ass'n, 17 A.D.2d 327, 329-30, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862, 864-65 (1st Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12
N.Y.2d 998, 189 N.E.2d 623, 239 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1963) (holding that while "local
laws which do not prohibit what the state law permits nor allow what the state
law forbids are not inconsistent ... where the extension of the principle of the
state law by means of the local law results in a situation where what would be
permissible under the state law becomes a violation of the local law, the latter
law is unauthorized") (citations omitted).
16 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 1399-o(1)(a) (McKinney 1990).
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mit that which state law prohibits. If it were challenged on the
ground that state law preempted it, the ordinance would al-
most certainly be invalidated.
It is important to note that, where local law prohibits that
which the state law permits, the permission at the state level
must be express in order for any potential inconsistency to
come into play. If the state law merely permits an action
through silence on the matter and has not otherwise preempt-
ed the field of regulation, then localities are free to regulate
the matter as they please within the limits of their home rule
powers.14 For example, New York state law permits, merely
through its silence on the subject, selling cigarettes without
any price differential based on tar and nicotine content. 48
Because the state permission is not express but is instead
merely implicit in the state legislature's silence on the subject,
if a municipality adopted such a price differential, the ordi-
nance would not likely be found to conflict impermissibly with
state law if ever challenged. Only if the state had expressly
permitted or required the sale of cigarettes without a price
differential would the municipal law requiring such a differen-
tial be vulnerable to attack on the basis of inconsistency. 49
.. See, e.g., Cook, 34 N.Y.2d at 109, 312 N.E.2d at 457, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 266(noting that "[any time that the State law is silent on a subject, the likelihood is
that a local law regulating that subject will prohibit something permitted else-
where in the State. That is the essence of home rule."). The court in Cook held
that where the state was silent regarding price differentials based on the tar and
nicotine content of cigarettes, the mere fact that the state also taxes cigarettes
bears no relation to the city's taxation of cigarettes, and thus created no incon-
sistency. See id.
" See People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 312 N.E.2d 452, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259
(1974).
1' See, e.g., id. at 109, 312 N.E.2d at 457-58, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67. As a
final note, even in the event of inconsistency, a municipality may validly adopt a
local law which is inconsistent with a state law if there is "a real distinction be-
tween the city and other parts of the State." Robin, 30 N.Y.2d at 351, 285 N.E.2d
at 287, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 129 (internal quotes omitted). Under this "special condi-
tions" exception, the local regulation 'must be based upon special conditions exist-
ing in the [municipality]." Id. (internal quotes omitted). In Robin, the court dis-
missed the notion that special conditions regarding the performance of abortions
might exist in Hempstead, such that a local law which prohibited that which a(here, preemptive) state law permitted should be considered valid. The court of-
fered no analysis, however, merely stating that "[ilt is hardly necessary to re-
mark . . . that there are no 'special conditions' concerning the performance of
abortions in the Village of Hempstead, as opposed to the rest of the State, which
warrant enactment of the local ordinance." Id. In order for the court to find a
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C. The New York Home Rule Framework in the Context of
Current Tobacco Control Ordinances, Proposed State
Legislation and the Multistate Settlement Agreement
Following the framework given above, there are numerous
ways in which municipalities in New York may validly use the
police power given to them through their home rule provisions
to adopt tobacco control laws and ordinances. Such ordinances
normally fall into one of two categories: youth access restric-
tions and environmental tobacco smoke ("ETS") restrictions.
Frequently, such restrictions are adopted at the county level,
rather than at the level of a smaller subdivision such as a
town or village, primarily in the interests of uniformity. The
following sections will analyze ordinances falling into each of
the two categories in light of both state law and the provisions
of the 1998 Multistate Tobacco Settlement Agreement ("MSA7).
1. Youth Access Restrictions
Despite the existence of both state law and MSA provi-
sions on the subject, there exists much room for New York
municipalities to regulate youth access to tobacco products.
Regulation of tobacco products vending machines, self-service
displays, cigarette and other tobacco product pack size and
increasing penalties for the violation of youth access laws are
all likely within the scope of municipal authority in New York.
Moreover, in regulating such subjects, state law permits mu-
nicipalities to delegate administrative authority over ordinance
provisions to local agencies or branches of government, as well
as to provide enforcement mechanisms for the regulations they
adopt, whether pursuant to their police powers or other grants
special condition, the condition must, for example, be "distinct in its intensity and
volume from that found elsewhere in the state." People v. Nemadi, 140 Misc. 2d
712, 720-21, 531 N.Y.S.2d 693, 699-700 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1988). Giv-
en the unlikelihood that special conditions regarding smoking would exist in any
particular municipality in contrast with anywhere else in the state, and given the
attitude courts have had towards similarly general subjects such as abortion as a
reasonable subject of local regulation under the special conditions exception, it
appears improbable that this exception will have any significant role in tobacco
control efforts.
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of authority.5 ' Virtually all New York localities that have
adopted tobacco control regulations have taken advantage of
this power.'51
a. Vending Machine Siting Restrictions
Among the steps which they may take to restrict youth
access to tobacco products, New York localities may adopt laws
banning tobacco products vending machines from any place of
public access. Such laws protect the public health by making it
more difficult for minors to obtain tobacco products,'52 and,
150 See N.Y MUN. HOME RULE LAW §§ 10(4)(a), 10(4)(b) (McKinney 1994).
... For examples of enforcement mechanisms employed by various New York
municipalities, see Rensselaer County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 1-1998,
§ 8) (providing that any person or business in violation of the county's tobacco
products advertising restrictions shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to $300
for the first violation, $500 for the second violation within a two-year period, and
$1,000 for each subsequent violation within a two-year period); Suffolk County,
N.Y., [1998] Suffolk County Code § 437-6 (providing that any person who violates
any section of the local law regulating ETS and tobacco products vending machine
sales, among other matters, shall be fined up to $250 for each separate violation
and that violation of the county's vending machine ordinance also constitutes an
unclassified misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of up to $1,000 and/or six months
in jail); see also Schenectady County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 6-1997)
(providing that the county board of health impose a civil penalty of at least $250
but not more than $500 for a first violation and at least $500 but not more than
$2,000 for each subsequent violation, but that, if the offending retailer has regis-
tered as a retail dealer with the enforcement officer and filed a certification that
her or his retail location has adopted certain policy measures regarding the sale of
tobacco products to minors, the penalties are lowered to not more than $100 for a
first violation and not more than $1,000 for a subsequent violation). Regarding the
Schenectady ordinance, state law provides that violations of article 13-F of New
York Public Health Law are to be punished by a penalty of $100 to $300 for a
first violation and $1,000 for each subsequent violation. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 1399-ee(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999). The section also provides that a re-
tailer who violates article 13-F three times within a two year period, or four or
more times cumulatively shall have her or his permit to sell tobacco products
suspended for one year. See id. § 1399-ee(3)(b). Thus, for those retailers not com-
plying with the local registration and policy restrictions, the Schenectady ordinance
provides locally for greater penalties for violating the state restrictions on tobacco
sales to minors than those given at the state level.
,' See U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE
AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 157-203248-253
(1994) (providing the results of the thirteen studies performed between 1987 and
1994 regarding youth access to tobacco products through sales and showing suc-
cessful purchase rates between 32% for youths aged 12 and 15 in one study in
Kansas and 100% for youths between the ages of nine and 17 in five different
studies in California, Illinois, Oregon, Kansas and Colorado).
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according to a 1994 New York Court of Appeals case, are nei-
ther expressly nor implicitly preempted by state law.'53
A number of New York municipalities have adopted re-
strictions on the sale of tobacco products through vending ma-
chines. Nassau County restricts the siting of tobacco products
vending machines to places under direct, full-time visual su-
pervision of the owner or agent of commercial establishments
with full, on-premises liquor licenses, private clubs, tobacco
businesses, locations off-limits to the public in places of em-
ployment in which an "insignificant" number of the employees
are under the age of 18, and smoking rooms."5 Genesee
County prohibits sales of all tobacco products except cigars and
pipe tobacco through vending machines in any location except
tobacco businesses.' 5 The City of New York prohibits vend-
ing machine sales of tobacco products in any location except
areas 25 feet or more from a door inside a tavern in which
sales of food products are incidental.'56  When a cigarette
vending machine lessor challenged the New York City
law, the state court of appeals upheld it, even though the
New York City law was more restrictive than state law on
the subject.'57
'53 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-dd (regulating tobacco products vending
machines and containing no preemption provision); see also Vatore v. Commission-
er of Consumer Affairs, 83 N.Y.2d 645, 651, 634 N.E.2d 958, 960-61, 612 N.Y.S.2d
357, 359-60 (1994) (holding that state law on the subject did not preempt localities
from adopting their own restrictions on tobacco products vending machines). While
there is at least one bill under consideration in the 222d Annual Legislative Ses-
sion that would augment current state law provisions concerning tobacco products
vending machines, the bill adds no preemptive language. See N.Y.S. 440, 222d
Sess. (1999) (which would amend section 1399-dd of the New York Public Health
Law to prohibit the placement of tobacco products vending machines in any build-
ing located within 350 feet of a school, church, synagogue or other place of wor-
ship).
15 See, e.g., Miscellaneous Laws of Nassau County, tit. 28, § VI (1998).
... See Genesee County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 3-1997, § 2).
15 See New York, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 67).
7 See Vatore, 83 N.Y.2d at 651, 634 N.E.2d at 960-61, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60
(holding that city ordinance banning tobacco products vending machines was not
preempted by state law, even though the ordinance was more restrictive than
state law, because state law evinced no intent to preempt the field). Tobacco con-
trol laws such as the one under consideration in Vatore are likely to survive chal-
lenge, notwithstanding the existence of a state law regulating the same subject,
where state law does not expressly preempt the subject of regulation. For the
state law regulating sale of tobacco products through vending machines, see N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-dd (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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Note that the MSA contains no restrictions on tobacco
products vending machines. This makes it all the more impor-
tant for New York municipalities to step in to fill the gap left
by the MSA's silence on the subject. Numerous studies have
shown that minors generally have substantial success in ille-
gally purchasing tobacco products through vending machines.
Thus, because the MSA leaves the ability of states and
localities to restrict the siting of tobacco products vending
machines totally unaffected, New York municipalities inter-
ested in tobacco control should continue to regulate vending
machine placement.158
b. Restrictions on Freestanding Displays of Tobacco Products
New York municipalities may also adopt ordinances ban-
ning freestanding displays of tobacco products.'59 As of Octo-
ber 1998, only five counties had adopted any restrictions on
freestanding displays. Chautauqua County,16 ° Cortland Coun-
ty,161 and Erie County 62 ban all such displays. Genesee
County bans freestanding displays of all tobacco products ex-
cept cigars and pipe tobacco.'63 The legislative findings or
purpose sections of these ordinances state that they are based
either on health concerns or the desire to help prevent the
delinquency of minors. New York law does not currently con-
tain any prohibition on freestanding displays of tobacco prod-
ucts. Neither does the MSA.16
15' The MSA provides that the participating manufacturers will not oppose legis-
lation to limit youth access to vending machines. See MSA, supra note 1, at Exh.
F.
159 See, e.g., Genesee County, N.Y., [19981 N.Y. Local Laws (No. 3-1997, § 2)
(prohibiting self-service displays of all tobacco products, with the exception of ci-
gars and pipe tobacco).
1" See Chautauqua County, N.Y., [19971 N.Y. Local Laws (No. 7).
... See Cortland County, N.Y., [19971 N.Y. Local Laws (No. 6).
162 See Erie County, N.Y., [1997] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 6).
See Genesee County, N.Y., [1997] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 3).
1" See Laura Hermer & Graham Kelder, Youth Access Provisions, in TOBACCO
CONTROL RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 11, at 53.
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c. Minimum Tobacco Product Pack Size Requirements
Other steps to limit youth access to tobacco products which
New York municipalities may take include requiring that ciga-
rettes be sold in packs, closed and wrapped by the original
manufacturer, which contain no fewer than twenty cigarettes.
State law currently provides that "[aIll tobacco cigarettes sold
or offered for sale by a retail dealer shall be sold or offered for
sale in the package, box, carton or other container provided by
the manufacturer, importer, or packager which bears all health
warnings required by applicable law."'65 It does not, however,
stipulate a minimum pack size. It also neither expressly pre-
empts local law, nor is likely to provide such a detailed scheme
of regulation to imply preemption. The MSA also does little to
fill the gap in state law. While it stipulates a minimum pack
size for both cigarettes and loose tobacco, the provision re-
mains in force only until December 31, 2001.166 Thus, not on-
ly may New York municipalities adopt a minimum pack size
requirement, but they should in fact opt to do so rather than to
rely on the time-limited provision given by the MSA.
d. Licensing Tobacco Products Retailers
New York municipalities may also be able to follow the
lead of Schenectady County by licensing tobacco products re-
tailers.167 New York state law already provides for the reg-
istration of tobacco product retailers and for penalties for re-
tailers who are caught selling tobacco products to minors. 68
If an enforcement officer determines after a hearing that a
retailer has violated article 13-F, which regulates the distribu-
tion of tobacco products to minors, three times within a two
year period or four times overall, state law requires the officer
to "direct the commissioner of taxation and finance to suspend
the dealer's registration for one year."'69
165 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-gg (McKinney 1999).
164 See MSA, supra note 1, § II(k); see also Hermer & Kelder, supra note 164.
16 See Schenectady County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 6-1997).
, See N.Y. TAX LAW § 480-a (McKinney 1999); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW art. 13-
F.
169 N.Y. PB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-ee(3).
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Although none of the state provisions concerning the regis-
tration of tobacco products retailers and the enforcement of
state youth access laws are expressly preemptive, the New
York scheme is a detailed one. Most of the key terms are de-
fined within the section itself.70 The regulatory scheme also
addresses most potential matters of concern in relation to
enforcement and regulation, including who is in charge of en-
forcing the article, how hearings are to be conducted, what
penalties are assessed for violation, and who may act in the
absence of action by an enforcement officer.17' As such,
New York state law appears at first to implicitly preempt
the subject.
However, there exists a mitigating factor which implies
that localities may license tobacco product retailers for the
purpose of enforcing state and local youth access laws at the
local level. In article 13-F, which deals with youth access and
enforcement issues, the state legislature expressly preempted
only one section of the article, concerning the distribution of
tobacco products without charge.' The sections concerning
enforcement of the article, however, contain no similar state-
ment of preemption. 73 Moreover, even if the sections con-
cerning enforcement were preemptive, one recent case suggests
that, at least under certain circumstances, state law preempts
only local ordinances which vary from the state directives. 74
In Vatore v. Comm'r of Consumer Affairs, the court stated that
"[w]here the State has preempted an entire field, a local law
regulating the same subject matter is inconsistent with the
State's interests if it either (1) prohibits conduct which the
State law accepts or at least does not specifically proscribe, or
(2) imposes restrictions beyond those imposed by the State
law."'75 Where a municipality merely issues a local permit or,
as in the case of the Schenectady law, imposes more stringent
... See id. § 1399-aa.
171 See id. §§ 1399-ee-1399-ff.
172 See id. § 1399-bb.
17 See id. §§ 1399-ee-1399-ff.
174 See Vatore v. Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, 83 N.Y.2d 645, 634 N.E.2d
958, 612 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1994).
171 Id. at 649, 634 N.E.2d at 959, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 358; see also New York State
Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 221, 505 N.E.2d 915, 920, 513
N.Y.S.2d 349, 354 (1987); People v. Cook, 34 N.Y.2d 100, 109, 312 N.E.2d 452,
457-58, 356 N.Y.S.2d 259, 266-67 (1974).
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penalties in order to more effectively enforce state law, there
should be no problem involving preemption of state law. More-
over, a municipality will not violate any provision of the MSA
in doing so, as no MSA provision concerns local licensing or
granting of permits to tobacco products retailers.
2. ETS Restrictions
Municipalities in New York may also regulate environmen-
tal tobacco smoke ("ETS") through prohibiting smoking in pub-
lic places.'76 ETS regulations have generally been enacted at
the county level in New York state. The legislatures of the
counties of Erie, Livingston (effective August 1999), Nassau,
Rockland and Suffolk have enacted ordinances restricting, or
altogether prohibiting, smoking in restaurant dining areas. 7
These ordinances also prohibit smoking in other places of pub-
lic access, typically places of public assembly, theaters, retail
establishments, common areas of multiple unit dwellings, and
public restrooms. 78 The same county legislatures have also
176 ETS regulations have generally been enacted at the county level in New
York state. The legislatures of the counties of Erie, Livingston, Nassau, Rockland
and Suffolk have enacted ordinances restricting or altogether prohibiting smoking
in restaurant dining areas. See ROSWELL PARK CANCER INSTITUTE, NEW YORK
STATE LOCAL TOBACCO CONTROL ORDINANCES: CLEAN INDOOR AIR (1998) (on file
with author). These ordinances also prohibit smoking in other blaces of public
access, typically such as places of public assembly, theaters, retail establishments,
common areas of multiple unit dwellings, and public restrooms. See, e.g., Erie
County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 5-1996, § 3); Livingston County, N.Y.,
[1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. C-1998); Rockland County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local
Laws (§ 349-5); Suffolk County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (§ 437-3). The above
county legislatures have also restricted or altogether prohibited smoking in the
workplace. See Erie County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 5-1996, § 3);
Livingston County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. C-1998); Rockland County,
N.Y., [19981 N.Y. Local Laws (§ 349-5); Suffolk County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local
Laws (§ 437-3). New York City is the exception to this rule. See New York, N.Y.,
[1998] N.Y. Local Laws (§ 17-503) (prohibiting smoking in certain public places,
including restaurants with an indoor seating capacity of more than 35); id. § 17-
504 (imposing certain smoking restrictions in places of employment). For the state
law governing smoking restrictions in enclosed areas accessible to the public, see
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o (McKinney 1999).
17 See ROSWELL PARK CANCER INSTITUTE, supra note 176.
178 See, e.g., Erie County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 5-1996, § 3);
Livingston County, N.Y., [19981 N.Y. Local Laws (No. C-1998); Rockland County,
N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (§ 349-5); Suffolk County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local
Laws (§ 437-3).
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restricted or altogether prohibited smoking in the
workplace. 7 ' New York City has also regulated ETS by pro-
hibiting smoking in certain public places, including restaurants
with an indoor seating capacity of more than 35,180 and by
imposing certain smoking restrictions in places of
employment.' Both state and local laws shield the health
and welfare of both smokers and nonsmokers by removing one
demonstrated harmful source of air pollution. 82 Moreover,
none of the state or local laws run afoul of any MSA provision
nor are they duplicated by any such provision, as the MSA is
completely silent on ETS and smoking in public places.
... See Erie County, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (No. 5-1996, § 3); Livingston
County, N.Y., [19981 N.Y. Local Laws (No. C-1998); Rockland County, N.Y., [19981
N.Y. Local Laws (§ 349-5); Suffolk County, N.Y., [19981 N.Y. Local Laws (§ 437-3).
180 See New York, N.Y., [1998] N.Y. Local Laws (§ 17-503).
1"1 See id. § 17-504. The state law governing smoking restrictions in enclosed
areas accessible to the public can be found in section 1399-o of the Public Health
Law.
'" See, e.g., E. Bermudez et al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke Is Just as Dam-
aging to DNA as Mainstream Smoke, 102 ENVTL. HEALTH PERS. 870 (Oct. 1994)
(demonstrating the ability of tar isolated from ETS to "nick," or create a single-
strand break, in DNA, thus increasing the likelihood for mutation); David S.
Celermajer et al., Passive Smoking and Impaired Endothelium-Dependent Arterial
Dilation in Healthy Young Adults, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 150 (January 18, 1996)
(showing an association between passive smoking and symptoms suggesting early
arterial damage); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO
SMOKE, IAQ COORDINATOR'S GUIDE App. F (1998) (noting that: (1) the EPA has
classified ETS as a known cause of cancer in humans; (2) ETS causes an estimat-
ed 3,000 deaths per year; (3) ETS causes irritation of the eyes, throat and lungs,
which in turn leads to excess phlegm, coughing, chest discomfort and reduced lung
function; and (4) "passive smoking is responsible for between 150,000 and 300,000
lower respiratory tract infections in children annually, resulting in between 7,500
and 15,000 hospitalizations per year"); A.M Hackshaw, Lung Cancer and Passive
Smoking, 7 STAT. METHODS IED. RES. 119 (June 1998) (confirming a causal asso-
ciation between the risk of lung cancer and exposure to ETS); K. Steenland, Expo-
sure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Risk Factors for Heart Disease Among
Never Smokers in the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey,
147 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 932 (May 15, 1998) (suggesting a link between exposure
to ETS and heart disease among those who have never smoked); M.T. Zenzes,
Immunodetection of Benzo[a]pyrene Adducts in Ovarian Cells of Women Exposed to
Cigarette Smoke, 4 MOL. HUM. REPROD. 159 (Feb. 1998) (showing an increased
level of adducts, or potentially-mutagenic additions, to DNA caused by a "potent"
mutagen and carcinogen in the non-germ ovarian cells of women exposed to ETS).
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III. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC HEALTH BODIES
The Public Health Council ("Council") is the advisory and
regulatory arm of the New York State Department of Public
Health. It is not a municipal body, and therefore none of the
foregoing analysis regarding municipal home rule law applies
to the Council. Rather, it is a body established by state law,
which functions on the local level by supervising the work and
activities of local boards of health and health officers. 8"' It
consists of a commissioner and fourteen members, who are
appointed by the governor with the consent of the state sen-
ate."8 The council is charged with advising and submitting
recommendations to the commissioner pertaining to the preser-
vation and improvement of the public health, appointing advi-
sory committees experts in major areas of public health con-
cern, and establishing, amending and/or repealing sections of
the state sanitary code.'85 Most relevantly, the council may
create or amend portions of the sanitary code which "deal with
any matters affecting the security of life or health or the pres-
ervation and improvement of public health in the state of New
York, and with any matters as to which the jurisdiction is
conferred upon the public health council."' In performing
any of these duties, however, it has "no executive, admin-
istrative or appointive duties except as otherwise provided
by law."
187
Local boards of health are frequently comprised of individ-
uals who already hold municipal office in some other
capacity. 88 At the county level, the board of supervisors may,
with the approval of the county commissioner, establish county
or part-county health districts and appoint a board of health to
oversee them. 89 The health board of cities containing fewer
183 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 201(a) (McKinney 1999).
'. See id. § 220.
i' See id. §§ 225(1), 225(2), 225(4).
I' Id. § 225(5)(a).
187 Id. § 225(3).
188 The authority for the existence of local boards of health is provided in sec-
tion 300 of the New York Public Health Law.
'89 See N.Y. PB. HEALTH LAW § 340(1)(a). No city or any portion of a city may
be included as part of such a district, however, unless the mayor and a majority
of the city council have consented to such inclusion, and no city of 50,000 inhab-
itants or more may be included unless a majority of the supervisors representing
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than 50,000 inhabitants must consist of the mayor, as the
board's president, and six other members nominated by the
mayor and appointed by the common council. One of these
members must be a physician." In villages, the board of
health must consist of the village board of trustees, and in
towns, the board of health must consist of the town board.'9 '
All these boards have similar functions, the most important of
which is the creation and publication of "orders and regula-
tions, not inconsistent with the provisions of the sanitary code,
as it may deem necessary and proper for the preservation of
life and health and the execution and enforcement of this chap-
ter in the municipality."19 2 They are also responsible for cre-
ating and publishing orders and regulations for the sup-
pression of nuisances or any other such matter which they
consider "detrimental to the public health in individual or
special cases."'93
The authority of public health councils to regulate tobacco
concerns has been tested twice in New York: at the state level
in Boreali v. Axelrod... and at the county level in Nassau
Bowling Proprietors Assn. v. County of Nassau."5 Both cases
resulted in poor outcomes and problematic precedent for those
who hope to use public health council regulations and sanitary
code provisions as additional tobacco control tools.
In Boreali, the court of appeals affirmed an order of the
appellate division, determining that the state Public Health
Council ("PHC") overstepped its regulatory authority by pro-
mulgating a code governing tobacco smoking in areas open to
the public because it took into account not merely health con-
cerns but also economic and social ones.'96 The plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the PHC's promul-
gation of a comprehensive health code regulating smoking in
public places.9 7 The regulations at issue prohibited smoking
that portion of the county has given its consent. See id.
19 See id. § 301(1).
191 See id. §§ 302(1), 302(2).
" Id. § 308(d).
19 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 308(e).
19 71 N.Y.2d 1, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1987).
195 965 F. S'spp. 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
19 See Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 6, 517 N.E.2d at 1351, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
"' See id. at 8, 517 N.E.2d at 1352, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
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in a "wide variety" of indoor areas; however, they granted
exceptions to certain establishments based on their maximum
occupancy or a showing of economic hardship, among other fac-
tors.'98 The court of appeals stated that, as an administrative
body, the PHC may legitimately administer the law as enacted
by the legislature and that it had broad power to do so under
New York Public Health Law section 225(5)(a).'99 However,
in promulgating the regulations, the PHC usurped a number of
non-delegable legislative duties, thereby transgressing "the
difficult-to-define line between administrative rule-making and
legislative policy-making."00  The court held that the PHC
promulgated the regulations in violation of the constitu-
tional separation of powers and that the regulations were
therefore invalid.20 '
The court identified several factors which the PHC consid-
ered, noting that none of these factors, standing alone, was
sufficient to warrant a determination that an administrative
body overstepped its authority, but that all of them together
warranted such a conclusion. First, the PHC "constructed a
regulatory scheme laden with exceptions based solely upon
economic and social concerns," rather than one in which public
health alone was taken into account.0 2 The court noted that
balancing health concerns with considerations of economic and
social import is solely a function of the legislature.0 3 While a
regulatory body may weigh these concerns against each other
if expressly given the authority to do so by the state legisla-
'98 Id. at 7, 517 N.E.2d at 1352, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
19 See id. at 10, 517 N.E.2d at 1354, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69. Section 225(5)(a)
of the New York Public Health Law § 225(5)(a) broadly authorizes the PHC to
"deal with any matters affecting the .. .public health."
20 Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 11, 517 N.E.2d at 1355, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
201 See id. at 14, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 471. Of particular rele-
vance, the court significantly mentioned that the board of health promulgated the
regulations in question after state legislature had repeatedly tried and failed over
the previous decade to enact a series of similar tobacco control measures. See id.
at 6-7, 517 N.E.2d at 1352, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 466-67. It is likely that this fact
played a sizeable role in engendering the stringent and harsh quality of the deci-
sion. See, e.g., Campagna v. Shaffer, 73 N.Y.2d 237, 243, 536 N.E.2d 368, 370, 538
N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (1988) (noting that "[a] key feature of [the Boreali] case ...
was that the Legislature had never articulated a policy regarding the public smok-
ing controversy"), cited in New York State Health Facilities Ass'n, Inc., v. Axelrod,
77 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 569 N.E.2d 860, 862-63, 568 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-4 (1991).
20 Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 11-12, 517 N.E.2d at 1355, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
202 See id. at 12, 517 N.E.2d at 1355, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
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ture, it may not use such a cost-benefit analysis otherwise.0 4
Second, the PHC in effect "enacted legislation" where the legis-
lature itself had never before acted. Rather than properly us-
ing its authority by filling in the legislative interstices, it in-
stead implemented a novel regulatory scheme.2 5 Third, the
agency acted in an area where the state legislature had al-
ready unsuccessfully attempted to construct and enact legisla-
tion.2 6 The court stated that it is the duty of elected repre-
sentatives to make hard choices among competing ends, and
that where such representatives fail, it is "not automatically"
the province of an administrative agency to step in.2 7 Fourth
and finally, the court took into consideration the observation
that "although indoor smoking is unquestionably a health
issue, no special expertise or technical competence in the field
of health was involved in the development of the antismoking
regulations challenged here."0 ' Here, the court described the
code drafted by the PHC as "simple," in contradistinction to
those regulations demonstrating the technical competence
required to fill in "broadly stated legislative policies."2 9
When taken altogether, these factors served as the
regulations' downfall.210
The Nassau County Board of Health ("Board") fared no
better in Nassau Bowling Proprietors Assn. v. County of
Nassau21' when the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, on .cross-motions for summary judgment,
struck down the Board's ordinance that prohibited smoking in
numerous public places because the ordinance took into ac-
count numerous non health-based concerns.2  At issue was
the Board's ability under its grant of legislative authority, first,
to adopt rules or regulations that create, limit or enlarge any
smoking restrictions, and second, to allow for non health-relat-
204 See id.
200 See id. at 13, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
206 See id.
2' Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 13, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
201 See id. at 13-14, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
20" See id. at 14, 517 N.E.2d at 1356, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
210 In 1989, the New York legislature succeeded in enacting a set of similar
laws regulating smoking in indoor, publicly-accessible areas. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 1399-n--1399-x (McKinney 1998).
211 965 F. Supp. 376 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
212 See id. at 380.
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ed exceptions, such as those relating to economic concerns, to
health regulations it is permitted to adopt.213
The court found that while the Board had the authority to
regulate smoking in accordance with New York Public Health
Law section 347, it did not have the power to consider non
health-related matters when promulgating such regula-
tions."4 Stating that the principles of Boreali are as applica-
ble to a county ordinance as to a state regulation, the court
noted that the Board, in public hearings, "extensively" ad-
dressed non health-related concerns2--one of the consider-
ations called into question under Boreali. Moreover, the Board,
without authority, adopted certain state classifications which
took non health-related factors into account.1 6 This was un-
acceptable to the court because the legislative creation of these
classifications presumably entailed consideration of "economic
interests and privacy concerns," whereas the Board was only
authorized to consider health issues."' As a result, the court
found that because the Board weighed and balanced "signifi-
cant concerns not within the ambit of authority delegated to
the Board," it acted outside of any grant of authority which
either the state or the county had given it."
21 See id. at 378-79. The plaintiffs cited section 1399-x of the New York Public
Health Law, prohibiting the State Public Health Commission from promulgating
any rules or regulations creating or enlarging smoking restrictions, in support of
their case. See id. The Board cited most notably section 347 of the New York
Public Health Law as one authority for its promulgation of the ordinance, granting
authority to county and part-county boards of health to "promulgate, adopt, and
publish rules ... for the security of life and health in the health district which
shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter and the sanitary
code." Id. at 379; see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 347(1) (McKinney 1998).
21' See Nassau Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, 965 F. Supp. at 380.
215 Id. at 380. The court cited as examples from the Board meetings' minutes
statements that "the Board was protecting the health of those people who do not
desire to breathe second-hand smoke ... but at the same time considering the
well-being of those who do not favor smoking ordinances, so the Board has to put
all these factors together," and that "work and leisure environments, health con-
cerns and a fair economic playing field were the chief areas of discussion" at the
meetings. Id. at 379-80 (internal quotes omitted).
216 See id. at 380. At issue was the fact that the Board had adopted the classi-
fications set forth in state legislation regulating smoking in public places and had
excluded bars and taverns from its own restrictions based on the fact that the
state also did so in its own enactments.
217 Id.
21" Nassau Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, 965 F. Supp. at 380.
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Although they may appear bleak, the outcomes of Boreali
and Nassau Bowling are not necessarily quite as dire as they
might seem for efforts to control tobacco through public health
regulations. First, the Boreali court held, on a peripheral ques-
tion, that the state indoor smoking restrictions, New York
Public Health Law article 13-E, do not "narrow [the PHC's]
statutory mandate [under New York Public Health Law section
225(5)(a)] or exclude the area of smoking restrictions."21 9 This
means that, despite the state's enactment of indoor smoking
regulations which expressly include a provision prohibiting the
PHC from adopting regulations under that particular article's
authority,22° the PHC may nevertheless adopt indoor smoking
regulations under either its broad mandate given by section
225(5)(a) or elsewhere. Second, notwithstanding the holdings of
the two cases, it is still a duty of the PHC and the Board to
"deal with any matters affecting the.., public health,"
221
and even the court in Boreali determined that smoking and
secondhand smoke are matters affecting the public health.2
Third, New York courts may decline to accept the implication,
drawn by the federal district court in Nassau Bowling, that it
is improper for a public health board or council to adopt leg-
islative classifications and exceptions, unless such classifica-
tions and exceptions were created by the legislative body of the
municipality which the board or council serves.2 1 It is possi-
219 Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 15, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1357, 523 N.Y.S.2d
464, 472 (1987).
220 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-x (McKinney 1999) (providing that "[t]he
commissioner [of public health] shall not promulgate any rules or regulations to
effectuate the provisions of section thirteen hundred ninety-nine-n, subdivision six
of section thirteen hundred ninety-nine-o or subdivision one of section thirteen
hundred ninety-nine-p of this article. The commissioner shall not promulgate any
rules or regulations that create, limit or enlarge any smoking restrictions.").
21 Id. § 225(5)(a); see also id. § 347(1).
2 See, e.g., Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 6, 517 N.E.2d at 1351, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 466
(noting that the Surgeon General began warning the public "that tobacco smoking
poses a serious health hazard," and that "smoking in the workplace has become a
cause for serious concern among health professionals"); Fagan v. Axelrod, 146
Misc. 2d 286, 293, 550 N.Y.S.2d 552, 556-57 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1990) (find-
ing that, while petitioners claimed that "it has yet to be proven that secondhand
smoke . . . represents a significant health hazard to nonsmokers . .. [the weight
of scientific evidence ... is overwhelmingly to the contrary").
2" Cf. Nassau Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, 965 F. Supp. at 377, 380. While the
court implied that it may be proper for the Board to have acted using "guidelines
or input" from the Nassau County Legislature, it was improper for the Board to
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ble that, should this issue arise at the state level, New York
courts may determine that public health boards may, as agents
of the state legislature, adopt classifications enacted at the
state level, even in the absence of express authorization to do
this within the statute in which the classifications are con-
tained. Fourth, and most important, while it is true that public
health boards may not pass regulations or ordinances which
usurp the authority to weigh and balance competing non
health-related interests from the legislature,224 they may,
nonetheless, base exceptions and classifications upon health
concerns." Thus, for example, the Board in Nassau Bowling
could perhaps have based its regulations, including its exclu-
sion of bars and taverns from its smoking ban, on the ground
of protecting children from ETS, given the myriad of studies
showing the health hazards of ETS to children. 6
In the absence of authorizing legislation, public health
boards and councils may have little ability to pass tobacco
control regulations which expressly take political, social and/or
economic concerns into account.227 However, by taking care to
act in conjunction with the legislature, or by carefully avoiding
adopt classifications and exceptions from state law. See id.
22 See, e.g., Boreali, 71 N.Y.2d at 11-12, 517 N.E.2d at 1355, 523 N.Y.S.2d at
470; 2 N.Y. JUR. ADMN. LAW 2d § 42 (1998).
See, e.g., Nassau Bowling Proprietors Ass'n, 965 F. Supp. at 380 (noting that
the Board "perhaps could promulgate a no-smoking ordinance with exceptions re-
lated to health concerns").
22 For example, the 1992 EPA's findings concerning children in its report con-
cerning the health effects of ETS still stand, even after the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d
435 (1998). See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH
EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992). A
board of health could use these (and other) findings to support an ordinance ban-
ning smoking in all places of public access in which children are permitted.
' While the court in Nassau Bowling Proprietors Ass'n stated that "[no doubt
incidental consideration of practical concerns, which could include economic mat-
ters, may be required in the Board's regulation of health matters," Nassau Bowl-
ing Proprietors Ass'n, 965 F. Supp. at 380, it appears optimistic at best in the
face of this case and Boreali to take this as assurance that any economic or other
non-health related considerations at all may be taken into account by a public
health board or council, absent express legislative direction. See id. at 377, 380.
Otherwise, an administrative agency must rely on a legislative grant of specific
authority in order to act which does not run afoul of the separation of powers
doctrine. See Boreali v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 1, 14-15, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1356-57,
523 N.Y.S.2d 464, 471-72 (1987); Campagna v. Shaffer, 73 N.Y.2d 237, 242-243,
536 N.E.2d 368, 370, 538 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 (1988).
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legislative functions in the absence of statutory guidance, regu-
lation by public health boards should continue as a tool in the
service of tobacco control.
228
CONCLUSION
The statutes and constitutional provisions governing mu-
nicipal home rule power grant New York localities broad au-
thority to adopt and amend laws regulating the sale, availabili-
ty, advertisement and use of tobacco products. This authority
under home rule powers remains substantial even when state
laws regulate the same subject, as long as the state has not
preempted the field and the municipal law is not inconsistent
with the state law. Moreover, the Multistate Tobacco Settle-
ment Agreement has done little to fill in gaps in state law,
leaving plenty of room for municipalities to step in.
It is clear that municipal legislative bodies have more
ability than public health boards to adopt tobacco control regu-
lations in the absence of any higher guiding legislative authori-
ty. Public health boards, however, should be able to function as
partners with the legislature and local governments in efforts
to control tobacco. Given the wide latitude granted to munici-
palities to adopt and amend laws regulating tobacco, the future
looks bright for tobacco control at the local level in New York.
28 Given the grant of authority provided by section 225(5)(a) of the New York
Public Health Law and given the Boreali court's holding concerning the ability of
the PHC to adopt tobacco control regulations in general, it appears likely that a
public health board could adopt regulations, for instance, completely banning smok-
ing in all places of public access, with any distinctions or exceptions made solely
on the basis of health. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. However, the
most prudent course of action would likely be for public health councils to seek
statutory guidance and authority prior to adopting tobacco control regulations.
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